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DYING TO KNOW: A DEMAND FOR 
GENUINE PUBLIC ACCESS TO CLINICAL 
TRIAL RESULTS DATA 
Christine D. Galbraith* 
"I'm sorry, but you have cancer ... " 
Nothing can quite prepare you for hearing these words from 
your doctor. Especially learning of such a diagnosis in your mid­
thirties, when the thought of battling a life-threatening disease 
hasn't even remotely crossed your mind. Advancing in one's 
career, building a family, buying a home-these are the typical 
sorts of things people my age are supposed to be doing. 
Confronting a possibly fatal illness like breast cancer certainly 
was not on any potential list of things to do I had ever imagined 
for myself. Nonetheless, several years ago I had no choice but to 
abruptly change course and begin planning a strategy to fight 
cancer, just like hundreds of thousands of other individuals in 
this country. 
In fact, there are more than a quarter million women living 
in the United States today who were age forty or under when 
they were first diagnosed with breast cancer. 1 Additionally, this 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law; B.S. University of 
Illinois, 1992; J.D. University of Illinois, 1995. Many thanks to Professor Thomas Ward 
and Professor Marty Rogoff for their insightful comments on earlier drafts. Much 
appreciation to Dr. Davina Ghersi, Director of the World Health Organization's 
International Clinical Trials Registry Platform, as well as many of the participants at 
the 2008 Stanford University Law School's Intellectual Property Scholars Conference 
and the 2008 Tulane Law School Works in Progress Intellectual Property Colloquium for 
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year almost 1.5 million Americans will learn they have some 
form of cancer, and more than half a million will die this year 
from their disease. 2 Once the initial shock of receiving a 
diagnosis of cancer or some other life-threatening illness wears 
off, the next step for most individuals is to work with their 
doctors to develop an appropriate treatment plan. For many, 
including myself, this involved contemplating whether or not to 
enroll in some form of a clinical trial. Quite unexpectedly, 
however, my position as an intellectual property professor whose 
scholarship focuses primarily on information control, my role as 
a member of my university's Institutional Review Board that 
oversees studies involving human subjects, and my newly 
acquired status of "cancer patient" converged. While 
researching various clinical trial options for confronting my own 
disease, I soon became aware of an unacceptable and 
unnecessary risk directly shouldered by study participants, but 
also indirectly borne by patients generally. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Each year approximately 10,000 clinical trials are. 
conducted in the United States,3 with more than two million 
individuals enrolling in these studies on an annual basis.4 Such 
extremely valuable conversations. I am also grateful to Julie Welch and Kevin Haskins 
for their exceptional research assistance. Additionally, I'd like to thank Dean Peter 
Pitegoff and the University of Maine School of Law for financial support in the form of 
summer research grants to complete this project. This article is dedicated to the many 
wonderful friends I have made on my breast cancer journey, as well as to the memories 
of those who have been lost to the disease. 
1 Figure based on the 2000 U.S. Census data and reported by the Young Survival 
Coalition. Young Survival Coalition, Statistics, http://www.youngsurvival.org/young­
women-and-bc/statistic/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2009). Additional statistical information on 
breast cancer in young women has been collected and is also available. Id. 
2 AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 2008 4 {2008), available at 
http://www .cancer .org/downloads/STT/2008CAFFfinalsecured. pdf. 
3 COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., HARNESSING OPENNESS TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN 
HEALTH CARE 14 (2008); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INNOVATION OR STAGNATION: 
CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY ON THE CRITICAL PATH TO NEW MEDICAL PRODUCTS 13 
(2004). 
4 See Wendy K. Mariner, Human Subjects, NAT'L L.J., May 13, 2002, at A25 (calling 
for the establishment of a single, independent federal entity to protect human subjects). 
One estimate of the number of patients needed to fill solely industry-sponsored trials 
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trials are an integral component of the development process for 
pharmaceuticals, 5 as the data generated supplies information 
necessary to obtain FDA approval of a new drug.6 This approval 
is essential in allowing the investigative treatments to move 
from the research bench to the relevant patient population, 
potentially providing more effective medical care and protocols 
with more tolerable side effects. Moreover, to the extent 
approval is acquired, further clinical trials are often conducted 
to potentially identify other indications 7 for which the 
medication might be useful or additional patient populations 
that could benefit from the drug in question. 8 
Individuals register to take part in these studies for a 
multiplicity of reasons. Often this includes the hope that they 
will potentially benefit from the offered treatment if they 
happen to be in the arm of the trial that receives the therapy 
under investigation.9 An additional rationale for most 
participants is the belief that the information obtained from the 
study will contribute to the body of scientific knowledge, 
ultimately assisting future patients. 
Participating in a clinical trial is not, however, without risk. 
worldwide has been placed at almost twenty million in 2005, up from nearly three 
million in 1999. See Emily Anthes and Scott Allen, US Cancer Researchers Go Abroad 
for Trials, BOSTON GLOBE, December 29, 2007, at Al (figures provided by BBK 
Worldwide, a US.based patient recruitment company). 
5 Clinical trials are also an important part of the process for obtaining FDA 
approval of medical devices and biologics, although the method of acquiring approval is 
slightly different. Furthermore, while the concerns raised in this article are also largely 
applicable to medical devices and biologics as well, for simplicity's sake I will limit my 
discussion of the issues to pharmaceuticals. 
6 See infra Part II discussing the measures required to obtain FDA approval of a 
new drug. 
7 For example, a pharmaceutical initially approved for treating breast cancer, may 
be tested to ascertain whether it also could effectively be utilized in connection with 
prostate cancer. 
s This might include a drug that has initially received FDA approval for use in 
breast cancer patients that have a very advanced form of the disease, which might then 
be tested to determine whether it also would be beneficial for those individuals 
diagnosed at a much earlier stage. 
9 Clinical trials are frequently structured in such a way that one group of patients 
receives the investigational treatment, while the comparison group receives the standard 
therapy for the condition at issue or, in some situations, only a placebo. 
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As such, federal law requires researchers to provide prospective 
enrollees with information necessary to ideally make an 
educated decision regarding whether or not to take part in the 
study. 10 It is only after fully considering all of the relevant 
advantages and drawbacks to enrolling in a clinical trial can a 
patient truly provide the mandatory informed consent to 
treatment. 11 In most cases, potential study participants will be 
advised that taking part in the study by no means guarantees 
improvement in one's condition.12 Furthermore, study 
investigators must supply prospective enrollees with 
information regarding the complete range of potential side 
effects, including in appropriate circumstances, disclosing that 
serious complications are a genuine possibility. 13 While it is 
impossible to completely eliminate all of the conceivable safety 
threats associated with participation in a clinical trial, patients 
are routinely exposed to a significant hazard of which they are 
not only unaware, but even more disturbing, one that is for the 
most part avoidable. 
Historically, results from previous clinical studies have not 
been required to be made public, and drug companies have 
generally been exceptionally resistant to such disclosure. The 
pharmaceutical industry now substantially overshadows the 
federal government as the single greatest source of financial 
support for conducting clinical trials. 14 As such, these 
companies have taken the position that if they are funding the 
research, the data produced should consequently be deemed 
their property, protectable through patent, trade secret, and 
contract law.15 Additionally, the FDA has generally supported 
this view, and the courts by and large have similarly agreed. 16 
10 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2007). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 The vast majority of clinical trials are now funded by for·profit companies. See 
Shankar Vedantam, Drugmakers Prefer Silence on Test Data, WASH. POST, July 6, 2004, 
atAl. 
1s See infra Part VI discussing these legal arguments. 
1s See infra Part II discussing FDA regulations which prohibit the disclosure of 
proprietary information. 
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Accordingly, only a small fraction of trial outcomes are 
eventually published in medical journals or in some other peer­
reviewed format. 17 Moreover, research has shown that most of 
the pieces ultimately published tend to be about trials that 
demonstrate the treatment under investigation was in fact 
superior as compared to the traditional therapy or placebo. 18 
This propensity for journals including articles on clinical studies 
with positive results is frequently referred to as "publication 
bias."19 
From a practical standpoint, this means that future studies 
are generally not informed by previous research. This is 
particularly true of clinical trials that have negative outcomes. 
As a result, additional studies involving identical or similar 
treatment regimes may be repeated without the knowledge of 
patients, doctors, or other researchers. Such a possibility is not 
merely theoretical as, for example, competitors often develop 
and test molecular entities in the same class with comparable 
mechanisms of action or, as often the case may be, inaction. 
Consequently, when clinical investigators replicate trials 
that have previously been shown to be ineffective or even 
harmful, human subjects are placed at considerable risk. By 
failing to release pertinent information regarding the results of 
earlier trials, study participants are often left to shoulder the 
significant danger posed by the investigational treatment 
without the potential fo_r any benefit, in contradiction to 
commonly recognized ethical standards. Furthermore, to the 
extent results from clinical trials never enter the public domain, 
the compelling contribution of these patients becomes 
essentially meaningless. This has prompted many in the 
worldwide medical community to characterize this failure to 
publish the results as a form of scientific misconduct and a 
17 The peer-review process is often extolled by the medical and scientific community 
as the ideal method of publishing and is the one used most by the leading journals. This 
model generally allows for review of the research data and the article itself by other 
experts in the field prior to publication. Nonetheless, while there are reasons to believe 
this may be the preferred approach, the peer-review process does not completely 
guarantee the accuracy of the information contained within the published piece. 
1s See infra Part VII reviewing the wide body of research devoted to this topic. 
19 See infra Part VII examining publication bias and its various implications. 
HeinOnline -- 78 Miss. L.J. 709 2008-2009
710 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78.4 
violation of ethical principles. 20 As an editorial in the New 
England Journal of Medicine so aptly stated, ''When patients 
put themselves at risk to participate in clinical trials, they do so 
with the tacit understanding that their risk is part of the public 
record, not merely the secret record of the sponsor."21 
Additionally, the failure to disclose study results not only 
impacts clinical trial participants, but the health of the general 
public may be put in jeopardy as well. For drugs that have 
received FDA approval, post-market clinical trials investigating 
new uses of the medication often reveal important information 
concerning side effects and related adverse complications with 
the treatment. To the extent that prescribing physicians do not 
have this essential data, they could inadvertently be putting 
their patients at serious risk by continuing to recommend the 
medication. 
Over the past few years, numerous scandals in the drug 
industry illustrate that concealing unfavorable research results 
is far from an isolated practice. 22 Cases have implicated many of 
the leading pharmaceutical companies and involved such 
blockbuster drugs as Paxil and Vioxx, to name just a few. 23 In a 
quest to boost sales and increase corporate profits, the 
temptation to hide or selectively disclose clinical trial data has 
proven to be too much. 
Amid mounting claims of misconduct by drug 
manufacturers and increasing concern regarding the FDA's role 
in the various controversies, both the Senate and House held a 
number of hearings on the issue.24 Congress responded to the 
20 
al., Principles for International Registration of Protocol Information and Results from 
Human Trials of Health Related Interventions: Ottawa Statement (Part 1), 330 BRITISH 
MED. J. 956 (2005); World Med. Ass'n, World Medical Association Declaration of 
Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, 284 JAMA 
3043 (2000). 
21 Jeffrey M. Drazen & Alastair J.J. Wood, Trial Registration Report Card, 353 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 2809, 2810 (2005). 
22 See infra Part III providing representative examples of several well-documented 
cases of such intentional deception. 
23 See infra Part Ill reviewing these cases. 
24 See Publication and Disclosure Issues in Antidepressant Pediatric Clinical Trials: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 26 (2004) 
See infra Part VII further examining this position. See Karmela Krleza.Jeric et 
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intensifying pressure by the medical community, patient rights 
advocates, and the general public25 by enacting federal 
legislation in late 2007 that purportedly provided extensive 
transparency regarding clinical trials by creating a clinical trial 
results database.26 One of the bill's sponsors, in extolling the 
virtues of the measure on the Senate floor, asserted that as a 
result of the new legislation "the public will [now] know about 
each trial underway, and will be able to review its results."27 
Unfortunately, this characterization is far from accurate. 
In actuality, the results of only a very small minority of the 
trials conducted involving human subjects will require 
disclosure under the Act as currently configured. This is due to 
the fact that with some minor exceptions, only data on later 
stage28 clinical trials must be released, and this is only if the 
treatment under investigation actually receives FDA approvai.29 
As even the FDA itself has acknowledged, "[T]he vast majority 
of investigational products that enter clinical trials fail."30 This 
scarcity of success is frequently attributable to a finding that the 
[hereinafter Antidepressants Hearing]; FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety 
First: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. (2004} [hereinafter Vioxx 
Hearing]; Ensuring Drug Safety: Where Do We Go From Here?: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Drug 
Safety Hearing]; FDA's Drug Approval Process: Up to the Challenge?: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 109th Cong (2005) [hereinafter 
FDA Approval Process Hearing]; Building a 21•• Century FDA- Proposals to Improve 
Drug Safety and Innovation: Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions, 110th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter FDA Improvement and Innovation Hearing]. 
25 See Fiona Godlee, An International Standard for Disclosure of Clinical Trial 
Information, 330 BRITISH MED. J. 7502 (2005} (discussing a recent survey that found only 
a quarter of Americans were of the opinion that the pharmaceutical industry was doing a 
good job; interestingly, such a low approval rating is in line with the public's perception 
of the tobacco industry.). 
26 Food & Drug Admin. Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110·85, 121 Stat. 823 
(codified as amended at 21 USC §§ 301 et seq.). 
27 153 CONG. REC. S11,831 (Sept. 20, 2007) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
2s Results from Phase I studies do not have to be reported. See Section II infra 
reviewing the various phases of clinical trials and Section VII infra discussing why the 
disclosure of Phase I trial data should be mandatory. 
29 21 U.S.C. § 355G}(1}(A)(iii) (2008). 
30 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INNOVATION OR STAGNATION: CHALLENGE AND 
OPPORTUNITY ON THE CRITICAL PATH TO NEW MEDICAL PRODUCTS 6 (2004}. available at 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/criticalpathlwhitepaper.html. 
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compound at issue is either ineffective or has significant safety 
problems, such as severe side effects. 31 As a result, a new drug 
entering the initial phase of trials involving human subjects is 
estimated to have only an eight-percent chance of ever obtaining 
federal approval and ultimately reaching the market.32 
This legislation therefore allows a tremendous amount of 
information to remain hidden away, falling far short of 
providing meaningful statutory reform. Studies which are 
unsuccessful may continue to go unreported with unfavorable 
results concealed. Ironically, most of the scandals which 
precipitated the push for reforms regarding data disclosure in 
the first place could still easily occur, as the supposed 
safeguards mandating release still would not require the 
information at issue in those situations to be made publicly 
available.33 
The only thing the statute truly appears to accomplish is to 
supply a means to potentially placate the public without 
displeasing the pharmaceutical industry. The drug companies 
continue to cite a wide variety of rather unconvincing arguments 
as to why any further disclosure would be completely 
unfeasible.34 Nonetheless, even assuming the possible merit of 
these contentions, it is not at all clear why the pharmaceutical 
industry's claims should take precedence. 
Incomplete release of study results not only impedes 
scientific research, but of even greater concern, needlessly places 
human lives in jeopardy. Such a state of affairs is wholly 
unacceptable. Therefore, this article calls for comprehensive 
disclosure of meaningful clinical trial results data from all 
studies, including the underlying raw data, regardless of 
whether FDA approval is ever obtained or even sought. This 
would offer true transformation of the current system, as well as 
31 ld. at 7. 
32 ld. 
3 3 See infra Part V discussing the numerous shortfalls of the Act and how it fails to 
adequately protect the public from future problems similar to those which have surfaced 
over the past few years in the pharmaceutical industry. 
34 See infra Part VI reviewing the various arguments put forth by the 
pharmaceutical industry and examining their claimed merit. 
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ensure the risk endured by the courageous men and women that 
volunteer for clinical trials is not worthless. 
This article begins in Part II by examining the important 
role clinical trials play in the FDA approval process. This 
section also reviews the regulations and policies that prohibit 
the FDA from disclosing the vast majority of relevant data 
included in the pharmaceutical company's application due to the 
fact that much of the material is classified as proprietary 
information. Part III discusses a number of well-documented 
controversies in the pharmaceutical industry involving the 
concealment or misrepresentation of clinical trial results data, 
including the FDA's actions in connection with these cases. Part 
IV briefly reviews the legislative precursors to the Food and 
Drug Administration Modernization Act ("FDAMA") which 
required the creation of a clinical trials database that eventually 
became law on September 27, 2007. Part V presents a 
comprehensive analysis of the FDAMA, discussing the 
numerous ways in which the statute is deficient. Part VI 
evaluates the many claims advanced by drug companies to 
support their position against expanded disclosure of results 
information. Included in this section is an analysis of the 
various legal constructs that drug makers have argued grant 
them an ability to control information regarding clinical trial 
results data, namely trade secret, contract, and patent law. 
Lastly, Part VII examines the compelling arguments that lend 
significant support to a demand for further release of clinical 
trial data. 
II. THE SIGNIFICANT ROLE CLINICAL TRIALS PLAY IN THE FDA 
APPROVAL PROCESS 
The federal government did not play an active part in the 
regulation of pharmaceuticals until 1906 when Congress passed 
the Pure Food and Drug Act. 35 This statute prohibited the sale 
of misbranded and adulterated drugs. 36 In 1938, the Federal 
35 Pure Food & Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 59·384, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed by the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938). 
3s Id. 
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Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") repealed the Pure Food 
and Drug Act.37 The FDCA required the FDA for the first time 
to evaluate studies conducted by manufacturers to determine if 
the drug was safe for its intended use prior to commercial 
distribution of the medication.38 In 1962, the FDCA was 
amended, mandating that a drug's sponsor not only prove a 
medication's safety as previously required, but also now validate 
its efficacy.39 This was to be demonstrated with evidence from 
adequate and well-controlled clinical trials.40 
Such a prerequisite continues today, as a pharmaceutical 
company must substantiate its claims that a drug is safe and 
effective to the FDA through studies involving human subjects 
before the treatment is approved for marketingY However, the 
FDA drug approval process doesn't allow for immediate testing 
on human beings. Instead, preclinical evidence must first be 
gathered. Typically, this commences with scientific researchers 
attempting to search for and identify chemical entities that 
show potential for treating or even curing a particular disease. 42 
Once such a compound has been ascertained, customarily the 
next step is to proceed with either extensive laboratory testing, 
or as more often the case, studies involving animals. 43 If this 
research appears promising, a pharmaceutical maker will often 
continue on with the approval process by filing an 
investigational new drug application ("IND"). 44 
37 Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938). 
38 Id. 
39 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780. 
40 Id. 
41 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(5) (2008). Pharmaceutical manufacturers must demonstrate 
"substantial evidence" of efficacy. See discussion infra Part II.A further discussing the 
FDCA's definition of this requirement and the FDA's interpretation thereof. 
42 U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE, 
BUSINESS, REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS HAMPERING 
DRUG DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 6 (2006). 
43 Id. 
44 The pharmaceutical industry estimates that on average only five in every 10,000 
compounds successfully complete this preclinical testing. See id. 
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A. Investigational New Drug Application (IND) 
A pharmaceutical company may not begin clinical trials 
involving the administration of an investigational drug to 
human subjects until an IND is submitted:45 The primary 
purpose of an IND is to supply the FDA with sufficient 
information from earlier studies involving laboratory animals or 
in vitro laboratory testing to make a determination as to 
whether or not it is reasonably safe to proceed with trials 
involving human beings.46 Additionally, the applicant must 
provide assurances that all proposed studies involving human 
subjects will first be approved and then continually reviewed by 
an appropriately constituted Institutional Review Board 
("IRB")Y While the FDA does not provide an official approval of 
the application, the planned studies may be subject to a clinical 
hold by the agency, namely an order to delay the anticipated 
clinical investigation until any problems are resolved regarding 
the intended protocol. 48 More often than not, the proposed 
investigational plan does not raise concerns. Accordingly, the 
IND will go into effect thirty days after the FDA receives the 
application, at which point the drug company may proceed with 
clinical trials involving human subjects.49 
Clinical investigations of pharmaceuticals that have not 
previously undergone human testing are typically divided into 
three principal stages. 50 While these three phases usually are 
conducted sequentially, in some cases they may in fact overlap. 1 5
The earliest introduction of an investigational new drug in 
human subjects occurs in Phase I studies.52 Such trials are 
45 21 C.F.R. § 312.20(b) (2008). 
46 21 C.F.R. § 312.22 (2008). 
47 21 C.F.R. § 312.66 (2008). The requirements for the composition, operation, and 
responsibilities of an IRB that reviews clinical trials regulated by the FDA is found in 21 
C.F.R. § 56 (2008). Failure to obtain IRB approval of research protocols may result in an 
inability to submit the findings from such trials to the FDA. See 21 C.F.R. § 56.103(b) 
(2008). 
48 21 C.F.R. § 312.42 (2008). 
49 21 C.F.R. § 312.40 (2008). 
so 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2008). 
51 Id. 
52 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(1) (2008). 
HeinOnline -- 78 Miss. L.J. 715 2008-2009
716 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78.4 
generally comprised of twenty to eighty healthy volunteers. 53 
However, in studies examining treatments that are expected to 
have significant toxicities, such as chemotherapy agents, only 
patients suffering from cancer will be allowed to participate in 
the clinical trial. The primary objective of Phase I studies is to 
determine appropriate dosing levels for the drug in question, as 
well as identify possible side effects. 54 
Phase II studies usually include no more than several 
hundred subjects. 55 Individuals involved in this phase, 
ordinarily consist solely of persons with the disease or condition 
under investigation. 56 These clinical trials are conducted 
primarily to evaluate the effectiveness of the pharmaceutical at 
issue, although side effects and risks associated with the drug 
continue to be monitored.57 
In Phase III trials, the medication is normally tested on 
several hundred to several thousand patients. 58 Similar to 
Phase II trials, the subjects in this stage also have been 
diagnosed with the disorder at issue in the study. Such trials 
are performed to collect further information about efficacy and 
safety which will then be used to determine the critical overall 
risk-benefit ratio of the investigative treatment. 9 5 Additionally, 
the studies provide the data that will form the basis for 
physician labeling of the medication.60 Phase III trials are 
typically the principal studies upon which the FDA relies in 
determining whether or not approval of the pharmaceutical is 
appropriate.61 
53 ld. 
54 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (2008). 
55 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b) (2008). 
56 ld. 
57 ld. 
58 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c) (2008). 
59 ld. 
60 ld. 
61 The FDA can utilizes its authority to make approval of an NDA conditional on the 
applicant's agreement to conduct post-marketing clinical trials, often referred to as 
Phase IV studies. Such studies are often employed to investigate issues concerning the 
drug's risks, benefits, and optimal use. 21 C.F.R. § 312.85 (2008). 
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B. New Drug Application (NDA) 
If the pharmaceutical company believes the evidence 
obtained from completed clinical trials demonstrates that the 
investigational drug shows potential for approval, the next step 
is to file a New Drug Application (''NDA") with the FDA.62 The 
NDA is designed to provide detailed information regarding the 
data obtained while the IND was in effect.63 Accordingly, the 
application must contain reports of every clinical trial sponsored 
by the applicant involving the medication, regardless of 
outcome.64 Additionally, all relevant information about the drug 
that has been acquired by the applicant from any source also 
needs to be provided to the FDA.65 
The FDA will analyze the information provided to 
determine whether or not there is adequate evidence to 
establish that the pharmaceutical is safe and effective for the 
conditions of use advanced by the applicant.66 In doing so, the 
FDA conducts a risk-benefit analysis in order to ascertain 
whether the advantages of the medication outweigh the 
potential for harm. 67 With regard to determining efficacy, the 
standard utilized by the FDA is that of "substantial 
effectiveness."68 This term was defined by the 1962 
amendments to the FDCA as follows: 
[E]vidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled 
investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts 
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could 
fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the 
drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have 
under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or 
62 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2008); 21 C.F.R. § 314 (2008). 
sa 21 C.F.R. § 314 (2008). 
64 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2008). 
65 Id. 
66 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2008); 21 C.F.R. § 314.125 (2008). 
67 21 C.F.R. § 312.84 (2008). 
ss 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2008); 21 C.F.R. § 314 (2008). 
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suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof. 69 
This definition has generated considerable debate, 
especially concerning the amount of data necessary to establish 
effectiveness. 70 Traditionally, the FDA took the position that 
Congress intended this to require results from at least two 
clinical trials that demonstrate the investigative drug is 
superior to a placebo or the conventional treatment.71 However, 
in 1997, as part of the FDA Modernization Act, the FDCA was 
amended to clarify that positive results from a single trial may 
be adequate. 72 
Conversely, there is no established number of negative 
trials that will be grounds for rejecting the application. In fact, 
there may be extensive evidence from numerous clinical studies 
of a drug ultimately approved by the FDA that shows the 
medication not only performed similarly to the control 
treatment, but actually was inferior. 73 For example, an analysis 
of clinical studies of antidepressants found that the makers of 
Prozac had to conduct five trials to obtain two that were 
positive, while the manufacturers of Paxil and Zoloft needed to 
sponsor even more. 74 Such trial results historically have not 
been disclosed by the FDA.75 Similarly, when studies reveal 
significant toxicity, this evidence also has not generally been 
69 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2008). 
70 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PROVIDING CLINICAL EVIDENCE 
OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR HUMAN DRUGS AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS 3 (1998). 
71 Jd. 
72 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 
103 (codified as 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2008)). The amended provision now states as follows: 
"If the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] determines, based on relevant science, 
that data from one adequate and well-controlled clinical investigation and confirmatory 
evidence (obtained prior to or after such investigation) are sufficient to establish 
effectiveness, the Secretary may consider such data and evidence to constitute 
substantial evidence .... " § 355. 
73 See infra Part III reviewing the negative clinical trial evidence associated with the 
many of the drugs involved in recent scandals. 
4 7 A. Khan et al., Severity of Depression and Response to Anti-Depressants and 
Placebo: An Analysis of the Food and Drug Administration Database, 22 J. CLINICAL 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 40, 40-45 (2002). 
75 See infra Part V examining how this disclosure policy was altered by the FDAAA, 
as well as discussing why these changes are not sufficient. 
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publicly released by the agency.76 
C. Confidentiality of Information Submitted to FDA 
Traditionally, FDA disclosure of materials submitted to the 
agency has been exceptionally limited. Data that is classifiable 
as trade secrets 77 or confidential commercial information 78 
typically cannot be revealed to the general public, unless the 
applicant grants permission to such dissemination. 79 In fact, 
even the mere existence of an IND or NDA filing may not 
generally be disclosed, unless this has been previously divulged 
or acknowledged by the applicant.8° Furthermore, under the 
Trade Secrets Act, disclosure of this type of data by an FDA 
employee constitutes a criminal offense.81 
76 Id. 
77 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(a) (2008) defines a trade secret as consisting of "any 
commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used for the marking, 
preparing, compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be said to be 
the end product of either innovation or substantial effort." See also infra Part VI 
evaluating the strength of claims by pharmaceutical companies that clinical trials 
results data constitutes a trade secret. 
78 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(b) (2008) defines confidential commercial information as 
"valuable data or information which is used in one's business and is of a type customarily 
held in strict confidence or regarded as privileged and not disclosed to any member of the 
public by the person to whom it belongs." See also infra Part VI examining the validity 
of drug industry arguments that clinical trials results data should be classified as 
proprietary information. 
79 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(c) (2008). 
80 21 C.F.R. § 312.130(a) (2008) (non-disclosure of IND filing); 21 C.F.R. § 314.430(b) 
(2008) (NDA filing will not be revealed before an approvable letter has been sent to the 
applicant). 
1 8 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2008) provides: 
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any 
department or agency thereof, . . . publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes 
known in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any information 
coming to him in the course of his employment or official duties or by reason of 
any examination or investigation made by, or return, report or record made to 
or filed with, such department or agency or officer or employee thereof, which 
information concerns or relates to the trade secrets, processes, operations, style 
of work, or apparatus, or to the identity, confidential statistical data, amount 
or source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, 
partnership, corporation, or association; ... shall be fined under this title, or 
imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and shall be removed from office 
or employment. 
See also infra Part VI examining the strength of arguments by the drug industry and the 
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These policies have been the source of immense frustration, 
as illustrated by testimony provided by a patient advocate in 
connection with a Senate hearing on the FDA approval process 
who stated as follows: "The FDA is probably one of the most 
secretive government agencies that any consumer will ever have 
to deal with. Virtually everything about a drug is considered 
proprietary. Agency officials will not talk with anyone about the 
drug unless the manufacturer gives them permission to do so."82 
Although certainly subject to debate, 83 clinical trial results 
have historically been categorized as trade secrets or 
confidential commercial information by the FDA. Consequently, 
such study data may not be disclosed without the consent of the 
pharmaceutical company that originally provided the 
information to the agency.84 Additionally, adverse events85 
reports required to be submitted by the drug manufacturer 
general concurrence of the FDA that such information comprises trade secrets. 
s2 FDA's Drug Approval Process: Up to the Challenge?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 109th Cong. 55-60 (2005) (statement of 
AbbeyS. Meyers, President of the National Organization for Rare Disorders). 
83 See infra Part VI discussing why the FDA's conclusions regarding the 
classification of clinical trial data as trade secrets or confidential commercial information 
is arguably improper. 
84 See infra Part V discussing the FDAAA and its arguably slight impact on the 
FDA's general policies regarding the reporting of clinical trials results data. 
86 An "adverse event" is defined by FDA regulations as "[a]ny adverse experience 
associated with the use of the drug that is both serious and unexpected," as well as, 
"[a]ny finding from tests in laboratory animals that suggests a significant risk for human 
subjects." 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(c) (2008). An adverse experience is "serious" if it "results in 
any of the following outcomes: Death, a life-threatening adverse drug experience, 
inpatient hospitalization or prolongation of existing hospitalization, a persistent or 
significant disability/incapacity, or a congenital anomaly/birth defect." 21 C.F.R. § 
312.32(a) (2008). Additionally, an adverse experience is "unexpected" to the extent that 
the incident is such that: 
The specificity or severity of which is not consistent with the current 
investigator brochure; or, if an investigator brochure is not required or 
available, the specificity or severity of which is not consistent with the risk 
information described in the general investigational plan or elsewhere in the 
current application, as amended. 
21 C.F.R. § 312.32(a) (2008). Furthermore, the regulation provides that "unexpected" 
refers to an adverse drug experience that has not been previously observed (e.g., 
included in the investigator brochure) rather than from the perspective of such 
experience not being anticipated from the pharmacological properties of the 
pharmaceutical product. 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(a) (2008). 
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concerning harms experienced by clinical trial participants 
associated with the use of the medication are treated similarly.86 
As a result, the FDA has traditionally refused to release this 
critical information for public scrutiny on the grounds it is 
proprietary. 87 
Ill. ALLEGATIONS OF SUPPRESSION AND MISREPRESENTATION OF 
CLINICAL TRIAL DATA IN THE DRUG INDUSTRY 
Virtually all of the major pharmaceutical companies have 
come under scrutiny in the past few years over claims they 
concealed unfavorable clinical trial findings or distorted the 
results of study information that they voluntarily chose to 
publicly release. The FDA's conduct has also been called into 
question in connection with many of these controversies, as 
evidence began to emerge that the agency had intentionally 
blocked or delayed warnings regarding use of the medications at 
issue from reaching the public. Additionally, these cases serve 
to highlight the numerous deficiencies in the law regarding the 
reporting of clinical trial data which allows drug manufacturers 
and the FDA to largely control all disclosure. As such, two of the 
most publicized controversies are reviewed below in more detail 
to provide context for the argument that increased access to 
study results is crucial. 
A. Anti-Depressants and Pediatric Patients 
1. GlaxoSmithKline's Paxil 
GlaxoSmithKline ("GSK"), one of the world's largest drug 
manufacturers, produces and sells the drug paroxetine. This 
medication is marketed in the United States as Paxil88 and has 
86 See infra Parts VI-VII examining the various arguments in favor and against 
further public disclosure of such information, as well as a related discussion concerning 
the definitional and organizational problems associated with the reporting system itself. 
7 8 See infra Part VII discussing the problems associated with such a policy. See also 
infra Part V examining the negligible changes to these rules by the FDAAA. 
88 This drug is also sold under the trade name Seroxat in many countries outside the 
United States, including Britain. 
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been approved by the FDA for treating a variety of indications, 
including depression, anxiety, and obsessive compulsive disorder 
in adults.89 This pharmaceutical has not, however, received 
approval for use in children or adolescents.90 Nonetheless, 
approximately 2.1 million prescriptions were written for use of 
the medication in this pediatric population of patients in a single 
year alone.91 Such conduct by physicians is permitted through a 
common practice referred to as "off-label" prescribing.92 While 
the FDA approves a drug for particular conditions and a specific 
type of patient population, doctors are allowed to prescribe FDA­
approved medications for other indications if a physician 
determines it is appropriate. 93 In order to reach such a 
conclusion, a doctor usually must rely on his or her assessment 
of information received from other sources in order to perform a 
risk-benefit analysis of the potential treatment.94 
On June 2, 2004, then New York Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer filed suit against GSK alleging that the company 
misrepresented safety and efficacy data by publicizing positive 
information about the use of Paxil in children and adolescents 
while withholding or misrepresenting other negative clinical 
trial findings. 95 GSK had conducted at least five studies 
examining the use of Paxil for pediatric patients. 96 The results 
of these studies not only failed to demonstrate efficacy, but also 
suggested the medication potentially increased the risk of 
suicidal thinking and acts. 97 Nonetheless, GSK implemented an 
aggressive marketing campaign to promote the questionable 
89 Complaint at ~ 2, The People of the State of New York by Eliot Spitzer v. 
GlaxoSmithKline, PLC (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 2, 2004), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/glaxo/nyagglaxo60204cmp.pdf [hereinafter GSK 
Complaint]. 
oo Id. at~ 2. 
1 9 Id. at~ 3. 
92 Id. at~ 2. 
93 Id. at~ 2. 
94 Id. at ~~ 12, 13. 
95 Id. at ~~ 4, 30. 
96 Id. at~~ 15-18. 
97 Id. at~~ 19-30. 
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benefits of the drug in children and adolescents.98 
A confidential, internal GSK memorandum provided 
employees guidance on how "[t]o effectively manage the 
dissemination of these data in order to minimise [sic] any 
potential negative commercial impact."99 This was necessary, 
since according to the document, the clinical trial results were 
"insufficiently robust" and would fail to support approval of an 
application for expanded use of Paxil to treat pediatric 
depression. 100 Additionally, the memo recommended publication 
of a full medical journal article only on the single study which 
contained some favorable conclusions.101 However, it further 
cautioned that "[i]t would be commercially unacceptable to 
include a statement that efficacy had not been demonstrated, as 
this would undermine the profile of paroxetine."102 GSK also 
allegedly repeatedly misrepresented the safety and efficacy 
outcomes from the studies to its sales representatives who 
consequently promoted the medication to physicians, as well as 
to doctors directly through the ''Medical Information Letters" the 
company distributed. 103 
Furthermore, after the United Kingdom's Medicines and 
Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA") 104 advised 
that paroxetine should not be used by children and adolescents 
to treat depression, 105 GSK issued a press release in Britain in 
which the company admitted that clinical studies revealed "a 
difference between [paroxetine] and placebo in terms of suicidal 
98 Id. at ~ 30. 
99 Id. at~ 31. 
100 Wayne Kondro & Barbara Sibbald, Drug Company Experts Advised Staff to 
Withhold Data about SSRI Use in Children, 170 CAN. MED. Ass'N. J. 783, 783 (2004) 
(discussing the contents of the GSK internal document, which was obtained and 
consequently published by the journal). 
101 GSK Complaint, supra note 89, at ~ 32. 
102 Kondro & Sibbald, supra note 100, at 783. 
1o3 GSK Complaint, supra note 89, at~~ 37-39, 41-45. 
104 The MHRA is the British equivalent of the FDA in the United States. 
105 MED. AND HEALTHCARE PRODUCTS REGULATORY AGENCY, SAFETY REVIEW OF 
ANTIDEPRESSANTS USED BY CHILDREN COMPLETED (2003), available at 
http://www. mhra.gov. uk/newscentre/pressreleases/CON002045 [hereinafter MHRA]. 
Following the MHRA's decision, the Irish Medicines Board also issued a similar 
directive. GSK Complaint, supra note 89, at ~ 49. 
HeinOnline -- 78 Miss. L.J. 723 2008-2009
724 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78.4 
thinking or attempts, particularly in adolescents."106 However, a 
few days later GSK issued a very different statement in the 
United States in which it merely noted that "there is no evidence 
that Paxil is associated with an increased risk of suicidal 
thinking or acts in adults" and that "not a single person [who 
participated in the pediatric paroxetine trials] committed 
suicide."107 
The New York Attorney General's complaint charged that 
by selectively disclosing information about the clinical trials, 
GSK misled and deceived physicians.108 By creating the false 
impression that the safety and efficacy evidence in GSK's control 
was incontrovertible, the company deprived those in the medical 
community of the materials necessary to properly evaluate the 
risks and benefits of prescribing Paxil to children and 
adolescents. 109 GSK publicly responded to these contentions by 
issuing a statement declaring it had "acted responsibly in 
conducting clinical studies in pediatric patients and 
disseminating data from those studies."11° Furthermore, the 
company stated that all trial data had ''been made available to 
the FDA ... and regulatory agencies worldwide."111 
Nonetheless, less than three months after the lawsuit was 
originally filed, GSK settled the case.112 As part of the 
Agreement, GSK was required to establish an online "Clinical 
Trials Register" to distribute summary information from 
company sponsored studies of FDA-approved drugs. 113 
Additionally, GSK promised to make certain that all 
10s GSK Complaint, supra note 89, at~~ 49-51. 
107 Id. at~ 61. 
10s Id. at ~ 63. 
10s Id. at ~~ 62, 63. 
11o Owen Dyer, GlaxoSmithKline Faces US Lawsuit Ouer Concealment of Trial 
Results, 328 BRITISH MED. J. 1395, 1395 (2004) (article contains a reprint of the complete 
statement). 
111 Id. 
112 Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Att'y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Settlement Sets New 
Standard for Release of Drug Information (Aug. 26, 2004), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2004/aug/aug26a_04.html (last visited Jan. 19, 
2009) [hereinafter N.Y. State Att'y Gen.]. 
113 Id. See supra Section IV examining the many deficiencies of such company 
sponsored databases. 
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communications it provided to the medical community regarding 
off-label uses of drugs would "fairly and accurately reflect the 
safety and efficacy data from clinical studies."114 Lastly, the 
company agreed to pay $2.5 million representing "disgorgement 
and costs" to the State of New York.115 While the New York 
State Attorney General's case against GSK may have been 
resolved, the controversy associated with the use of 
antidepressants in the pediatric population for psychiatric 
disorders had by no means come to a conclusion. 
2. Further Scrutiny of Other Manufacturers of Psychiatric 
Medications 
Less than a month after the settlement with GSK, the New 
York State Attorney General's office announced in early 
September of 2004 that it had reached a separate agreement 
with Forest Laboratories, Inc. ("Forest Labs"). 116 Forest Labs 
manufactures and distributes anti-depressants under the brand 
names Lexapro and Celexa.117 As with GSK's Paxil, the 
medications are only FDA approved for treating psychiatric 
conditions in adults, but were nonetheless regularly prescribed 
off-label for children and adolescents. The Attorney General had 
questioned whether the company had concealed information 
regarding the safety and efficacy of its drug.U8 Forest Labs 
responded to the inquiry by agreeing to publicly disclose clinical 
studies concerning the use of Lexapro and -Celexa in pediatric 
populations, as well as posting online the results from all future 
company-sponsored studies of approved medications.119 
Additionally, the New York State Attorney General's Office 
also revealed m the same statement that leading 
4 11 N.Y. State Att'y Gen., supra note 112. 
115 Id. 
116 Press Release, Office of N.Y. State Att'y Gen. Eliot Spitzer, Forest Labs to 
Establish Clinical Trials Registry (Sept. 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2004/sep/sep7b_04.html (last visited Feb. 4, 
2009). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
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pharmaceutical companies Eli Lilly and Merck had agreed to 
publicly disclose certain clinical trial information. 120 Eli Lilly 
markets its antidepressants under the brand names Prozac and 
Cymbalta, while Merck sells its medication as Vivactil. 121 Both 
of these companies were allegedly under scrutiny as well m 
connection with their selective disclosure of clinical trial data. 
3. Questionable Conduct by the FDA 
The FDA did not publicly acknowledge that antidepressant 
use by pediatric patients posed an increased risk of suicidal 
thoughts and actions until mid-September of 2004.122 The 
following month, the agency issued a public health advisory 
regarding the possible dangers associated with the use of the 
drugs. 123 Additionally, the FDA directed that all manufacturers 
of antidepressant medications place a "black box" warning on 
their products, although the agency did not expressly forbid 
doctors from continuing to prescribe these drugs for their 
younger patients.124 Despite taking such actions, the FDA came 
under intense scrutiny concerning its handling of the 
antidepressant controversy. 
120 ld. 
121 While it seems fairly clear the inquiry into Eli Lilly was with regard to its conduct 
in relation to the promotion of Prozac and possibly Cymbalta, it is not completely evident 
that Merck was under scrutiny concerning Vivactil. It is possible that the New York 
State Attorney General's Office may have been focusing their investigation on Merck's 
lack of disclosure surrounding its distribution of its Vioxx-brand pain reliever, although 
at the time of the Office's press release, the company had not yet received the 
preliminary results from a clinical trial which eventually compelled Merck to withdraw 
Vioxx from the market. 
122 Gardiner Harris, FDA Links Drugs to Being Suicidal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2004, 
atAl. 
123 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PUBLIC HEALTH ADVISORY: SUICIDALITY IN CHILDREN AND 
ADOLESCENTS BEING TREATED WITH ANTIDEPRESSANT MEDICATIONS (2004), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/antidepressants/SSRIPHA200410.htm. 
124 Id. A ''black box" warning is the most serious warning placed on the label of a 
prescription drug. Several years later, the FDA would expand the black box warnings to 
also include young adults ages 18 to 24 during initial treatment with the 
antidepressants. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA PROPOSES NEW WARNINGS ABOUT 
SUICIDAL THINKING, BEHAVIOR IN YOUNG ADULTS WHO TAKE ANTIDEPRESSANT 
MEDICATIONS (2007), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2007/NEW01624.html. 
HeinOnline -- 78 Miss. L.J. 726 2008-2009
2009] ·ACCESS TO CLINICAL TRIAL RESULTS 727 
This was due to the fact that questions continued to arise 
over the adequacy of the agency's response, particularly whether 
it came quickly enough to prevent public harm. For example, 
almost a year earlier British regulators had not only informed 
the public about the perceptible risks associated with the 
antidepressant medications evidenced through clinical trial 
data, but also generally prohibited further pediatric use of the 
drugs. 125 In response, a scathing editorial in the medical journal 
The Lancet declared that the FDA appears to have "failed to act 
appropriately on information provided to them that these drugs 
were both ineffective and harmful in children."126 This 
characterization would seem even more apropos as additional 
evidence concerning the agency's conduct came to light. 
In early 2004, one of the FDA's own drug safety analysts, 
Dr. Andrew Mosholder, completed his review of data from 
numerous clinical trials and concluded that antidepressant 
medications were clearly associated with an increased risk of 
suicidal behavior. 127 Mosholder found that pediatric patients 
were almost twice as likely to suffer a serious suicide-related 
event. 128 However, agency officials expressed skepticism over 
the reliability of his findings due to concerns regarding whether 
the sponsoring companies of the studies had classified suicidal 
cases properly.129 Thereupon, they ordered a second 
examination of the trial data by another FDA scientist.130 
Dr. Mosholder responded in a memo to this proposal by 
cautioning that an additional analysis was unwarranted since 
"it is unlikely that the new information will alter the basic 
finding of an association of ... serious suicide-related events 
125 MHRA, supra note 105. One of the few exceptions was Fluoxetine, marketed 
under the brand name Prozac, which according to the agency "appears to have a positive 
balance of risks and benefits in the treatment of depressive illness in the under 18s." Id. 
12s Depressing Research, 363 LANCET 1335, 1335 (2004). 
1 7 2 Shankar Vedantam, FDA Study Confirms Antidepressant Risks, WASH. POST, Aug. 
10, 2004, at A6. See Antidepressants Hearing, supra note 24. 
12s Vedantam, supra note 127, at A6. 
129 Id. 
1ao Id. See Susan Okie, What Ails the FDA?, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1063, 1063 
(2005). 
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with active treatment."131 Moreover, he urged the FDA in the 
meantime to officially discourage the use of antidepressants in 
children; however, the agency refused to do so. 132 
Instead, the FDA concealed his findings and prevented him 
from sharing his analysis with an FDA advisory committee 
convened in February of 2004 to investigate continuing public 
concerns surrounding the safety of the drugs. 133 Approximately 
six months later, however, the additional staff analysis 
requested by agency officials confirmed Mosholder's original 
conclusions. 134 
The continuing reluctance of the FDA to provide 
information to the public regarding the use of antidepressants in 
children and adolescents prompted a congressional hearing by 
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce in September of 
2004.135 Testimony revealed that the FDA had repeatedly 
restrained pharmaceutical companies from publicly disclosing to 
physicians that clinical trials had demonstrated the drugs had 
performed no better than the placebos, as well as additional 
negative findings. 136 The vice-president of pharmaceutical giant 
Pfizer recounted how the company had planned to include on the 
label for its medication, Zoloft, that two studies had found the 
drug no better than sugar pills; however, the FDA insisted that 
131 Vedantam, supra note 127, at A6. See Antidepressants Hearing, supra note 24. 
132 Vedantam, supra note 127, at A6. Almost two months later, however, the FDA did 
issue a "talk paper" to medical professionals concerning antidepressant use in the 
pediatric population, but it continued to maintain that it was "not yet clear whether 
antidepressants contributed to the emergence of suicidal thinking and behavior." FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., TALK PAPER, FDA ISSUES PUBLIC HEALTH ADVISORY ON CAUTIONS FOR 
USE OF ANTIDEPRESSANTS IN ADULTS AND CHILDREN (2004), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/bbsltopics/ANSWERS/2004/ANS01283.html. Additionally, a public 
health advisory published on the same date asserted that the "FDA has not concluded 
that these drugs cause worsening depression or suicidality." FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
PuBLIC HEALTH ADVISORY, WORSENING DEPRESSION AND SUICIDALITY IN PATIENTS 
BEING TREATED WITH ANTIDEPRESSANT (2004), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/antidepressants/AntidepressantPHA.htm. 
133 Okie, supra note 130, at 1063; Vedantam, supra note 127, at A6; Harris, supra 
note 122, at Al. 
134 Harris, supra note 122, at Al. 
135 Antidepressants Hearing, supra note 24; Shankar Vedantam, FDA Urged 
Withholding Data on Antidepressants, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2004, at A2. 
1as Vedantam, supra note 135, at A2. 
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existing language suggesting that efficacy had not been 
established for depressed children was sufficient.137 
FDA officials apparently adopted this approach due to 
concerns that divulging such information might scare physicians 
and their patients' families away from the drugs. 138 
Congressional committee members were incredulous with such 
reasoning, questioning why the FDA would not instead want to 
encourage such disclosures. 139 The agency's hesitancy to 
disseminate information would, however, continue to be the 
subject of congressional investigation and the source of public 
controversy. 
B. Pain Relievers and Cardiovascular Risk 
1. Merck's Vioxx 
On September 30, 2004, Merck withdrew its pain 
medication Vioxx140 from the market due to clinical trial data 
that demonstrated a significant risk of cardiovascular incidents 
such as heart attacks and strokes. 141 This represented the 
largest prescription-drug recall in history, as more than eighty 
million patients had formerly utilized this medication with 
annual sales for Merck estimated at more than $2.5 billion 
dollars. 142 In announcing this decision, Merck maintained that 
it had only recently learned of complications associated with the 
drug, but deemed such swift action appropriate as the company 
was committed to placing patient safety first. 143 However, 
137 Antidepressants Hearing, supra note 24; Vedantam, supra note 135, at A2. 
138 Vedantam, supra note 135, at A2. 
139 Id. 
140 While Merck generally marketed the medication using the trade name Vioxx, the 
medication is also known as rofecoxib. 
141 News Release, MERCK, MERCK ANNOUNCES VOLUNTARY WORLDWIDE WITHDRAWAL 
OF VIOXX (Sept. 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx_withdrawaUpdf/vioxx_press_release_final.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2009). 
142 Eric J. Topol, Failing the Public Health-Rofecoxib, Merck, and the FDA, 351 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1707, 1707 (2004). 
143 MERCK, supra note 141; Anna Wilde Mathews and Barbara Martinez, E-Mails 
Suggest Merck Knew Vioxx's Dangers at Early Stage, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2004, at Al. 
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internal company documents and interviews with outside 
scientists later revealed that Merck had in fact engaged in a 
deliberate campaign for years to conceal study results which 
demonstrated significant risks associated with the drug in order 
to prevent any negative impact on the sales of Vioxx. 144 
As early as the mid-1990's company officials became 
concerned that studies comparing less expensive pain relievers 
with Vioxx would reveal that its drug had much greater 
cardiovascular risks. 145 Therefore, executives at Merck 
discussed how to design a clinical trial that would potentially 
minimize the unfavorable comparison.146 At the same time, 
however, they recognized that such concealment would be 
difficult. 147 In fact, one company e-mail warned that a proposed 
study may provide evidence that patients taking Vioxx had more 
blood clots than those clinical trial participants receiving 
standard treatment which could "kill [the] drug." 148 Eventually, 
however, Merck chose not to conduct a trial to exclusively 
research potential cardiovascular risks. 149 Instead, company 
officials decided to simply monitor trials that had been 
previously planned to test Vioxx for other possible uses to 
determine if any additional evidence of heart attacks, strokes, or 
related problems emerged. 150 
In May of 1999, Merck received FDA approval to distribute 
144 Mathews & Martinez, supra note 143, at Al. See Alex Berenson et al., 
DANGEROUS DATA - Retracing a Medical Trail: Despite Warnings, Drug Giant Took 
Long Path to Vioxx Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, § 1 at 1. Both the Wall Street 
Journal and the N.Y. Times were able to obtain access to copies of the confidential 
internal Merck documents. 
145 Mathews & Martinez, supra note 143, at A1; Berenson et al., supra note 144, § 1 
at 1. 
146 Mathews & Martinez, supra note 143, at A1; Berenson et al., supra note 144, § 1 
at 1. 
7 14 Mathews & Martinez, supra note 143, at A1; Berenson eta!., supra note 144, § 1 
at 1. 
148 Mathews & Martinez, supra note 143, at A1; Berenson et a!., supra note 144, § 1 
at 1. 
149 Mathews & Martinez, supra note 143, at A1; Berenson et a!., supra note 144, § 1 
at 1. 
150 Mathews & Martinez, supra note 143, at A1; Berenson et al., supra note 144, § 1 
at 1. 
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Vioxx for the treatment of arthritis, as well as to provide relief 
from other types of pain. In March of 2000, the results from a 
study entitled VIGOR151 of more than 8,000 rheumatoid 
arthritis patients that compared Vioxx to the conventional pain 
reliever naproxen indicated a significant difference in the 
number of cardiovascular problems. The clinical trial 
participants that received Vioxx were five times as-likely to have 
a heart attack as those in the naproxen group. Upon review of 
the data, the chief of research at Merck acknowledged in an 
internal company e-mail that cardiovascular risks "are clearly 
there" and the differences were so dramatic that it could not 
solely be explained by any sort of protective effect offered by 
naproxen.152 Nonetheless, in a press release issued a month 
later, Merck downplayed the problems associated with Vioxx, 
stating that the VIGOR trial results were "consistent with" 
naproxen's clot-preventing properties. 153 The following month, 
the company announced in another press release that it had 
"confirm[ed the] favorable cardiovascular safety profile of 
Vioxx."154 Although it referred to the results of the VIGOR 
study, it proclaimed that other trials had shown "NO 
DIFFERENCE in the incidence of cardiovascular events" 
between Vioxx and other pain relievers or placebos. 155 
In November of 2000, an article on the VIGOR trial results 
appeared in the New England Journal of Medicine. 156 The piece 
was written by Merck employees, as well as academics who had 
financial ties to the company .157 It described the 
gastrointestinal benefits associated with Vioxx and the rates of 
heart attacks in the study. However, it implied that the 
151 The name VIGOR was an acronym for Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research. 
152 Mathews & Martinez, supra note 143, at A1; Berenson et al., supra note 144, § 1 
at 1. 
153 Mathews & Martinez, supra note 143, at A1; Berenson et al., supra note 144, § 1 
at 1. 
154 Mathews & Martinez, supra note 143, at A10. 
155 Id. 
156 Mathews & Martinez, supra note 143, at A1; Berenson et al., supra note 144, § 1 
at 1. 
7 15 Mathews & Martinez, supra note 143, at A1; Berenson et al., supra note 144, § 1 
at 1. 
HeinOnline -- 78 Miss. L.J. 731 2008-2009
732 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78.4 
increase in cardiovascular incidents only occurred in connection 
with patients already at high risk for heart attacks. 
Furthermore, the article failed to provide information 
concerning other cardiovascular complications, such as strokes 
or blood clots.158 
In 2001, the first significant article critical of Vioxx was 
published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, 
raising public concern over the risks associated with the 
medication. 159 Nonetheless, Merck continued to publicly 
maintain that clinical trial data suggested naproxen's 
cardiovascular benefits were responsible for the differences in 
the rate of heart complications, not problems associated with the 
company's drug. 160 At approximately the same time, however, 
Merck prepared a marketing document directed to "all field 
personnel with responsibility for Vioxx'' that provided an 
"obstacle handling guide."161 If a sales representative 
encountered a doctor that was worried Vioxx could potentially 
raise the risk of a heart attack, the Merck employee was to 
respond by stating the drug "would not be expected to 
demonstrate reductions" in cardiovascular incidents and that it 
was "not a substitute for aspirin."162 This evasiveness training 
also included a document aptly entitled "Dodge Ball Vioxx" 
which contained a listing of concerns doctors might be expected 
to bring up regarding the safety of the medication and then 
offered standard responses intended to neutralize the issue.163 
In September 2004, preliminary data from another Merck 
158 Mathews & Martinez, supra note 143, at A1; Berenson et al., supra note 144, § 1 
at 1. 
159 D.M. Mukherjee et al., Risk of cardiovascular events associated with selective 
COX-2 inhibitors, 286 JAMA 954 (2001). One of the authors of the article stated in an 
interview that Merck scientists visited him in an effort to convince him not to publish 
the piece. Merck officials have denied this allegation. See Berenson et al., supra note 
144, § 1 at 1. 
160 Mathews & Martinez, supra note 143, at A10 
161 Jd. 
162 Jd. 
163 Id. at Al. Additionally, the final four pages of the document each contained a 
single word in capital letters: "DODGE!" Merck officials maintain that they instructed 
their employees to be honest and ethical. Id. 
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clinical trial labeled APPROVe,l64 which was designed to study 
whether Vioxx might be useful in preventing colon polyps, 
generated significant alarm. 165 Despite the fact that patients 
were not eligible to enroll in the trial if they had any evidence of 
cardiovascular disease, those participants that were treated 
with Vioxx had approximately twice as many heart attacks or 
strokes as compared to those receiving only a placebo.166 
Additionally, company officials were informed that a safety 
monitoring board wanted to immediately terminate the study 
because of the potential for harm to the research subjects. 167 As 
a result, Merck could no longer defend against the mounting 
public concern surrounding Vioxx and therefore had virtually no 
choice but to voluntarily remove the drug from the 
marketplace. 168 
2. An Inquiry into the FDA's Actions Concerning Vioxx 
Not only was Merck under investigation for its handling of 
Vioxx, but the FDA's role in the controversy was also being 
carefully examined. Commentators increasingly claimed that 
the agency failed to observe the many warning signs that 
emerged, or even worse, intentionally suppressed critical 
information pertaining to the drug. 169 In November of 2004, a 
Senate committee held a hearing to explore whether the agency 
disregarded its responsibilities to protect the public from 
dangerous medicationsY0 Evidence began to surface that 
questions concerning the cardiovascular safety had been raised 
164 The name APPROVe was an acronym for Adenomatous Polyp Prevention ofVioxx. 
165 Mathews & Martinez, supra note 143, at A1; Berenson et al., supra note 144, § 1 
at 1. 
166 Topol, supra note 142, at 1708. See Mathews & Martinez, supra note 143, at A1; 
Berenson et al., supra note 144, § 1 at 1. 
167 Mathews & Martinez, supra note 143, at Al. 
16s Id. 
169 See, e.g., Topol, supra note 142, at 1707; Daniel H. Solomon et al., Relationship 
Between Selective Cyclooxygenase·2 Inhibitors and Acute Myocardial Infarction in Older 
Adults, 109 CIRCULATION 2068 (2004}. See also Berenson et al., supra note 144, § 1 at 1 
(discussing additional non·Merck sponsored studies that raised concerns about Vioxx). 
110 FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Finance, 108th Cong. (2004} [hereinafter Vioxx Hearing]. 
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by drug reviewers at the FDA even before Vioxx was 
approved. 171 
However, when Merck submitted the initial results from 
the VIGOR study to the agency in March of 2000, the FDA was 
quite alarmed by the findings. 172 While the company argued the 
significantly greater risk of cardiovascular events suffered by 
participants treated with Vioxx was due to the fact that they did 
not receive the cardioprotective properties of naproxen, the 
agency was quite skeptical. 173 Even top officials at the FDA 
testified that they found Merck's explanation unconvincing. 174 
Nonetheless, nearly two years passed before the FDA required 
Merck to alter its drug label on Vioxx to include information 
regarding the cardiovascular risks. However, following 
negotiations with the company, the agency allowed such changes 
to be placed in the "Precautions" section following claims touting 
the gastrointestinal benefits of the drug, rather than 
prominently displaying it as a "Warning."175 
In the meantime, Dr. David J. Graham, an epidemiologist 
who monitors drug safety for the agency, conducted an 
exceptionally large review of patients who had been treated with 
Vioxx to determine the incidence of cardiovascular problems 
potentially associated with its use. 176 The project took nearly 
three years to complete and confirmed that the drug was 
responsible for a substantial rise in cases of heart disease. Dr. 
Graham would eventually conclude, in his peer-reviewed article 
appearing in the prestigious medical journal The Lancet, the 
171 Id.; Berenson et al., supra note 144, § 1 at 1. 
172 Vioxx Hearing, supra note 170; Berenson et al., supra note 144, § 1 at 1. 
173 Vioxx Hearing, supra note 170; Berenson et al., supra note 144, § 1 at 1. 
174 Vioxx Hearing, supra note 170. The deputy director of the FDA's Office of New 
Drugs stated with regard to Merck's explanation, "We just didn't buy that." Id. 
175 Vioxx Hearing, supra note 170; Anna Wilde Matthews, Did FDA Staff Minimize 
Vioxx's Red Flags?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2004, at 11. Interestingly, at the congressional 
hearing, Dr. David J. Graham testified the drug's label change was wholly inadequate as 
it "had absolutely no effect on how often high-dose Vioxx was prescribed." Vioxx Hearing, 
supra note 170. At this point in time, Graham believed the appropriate course of action 
based on the available evidence was to place the cardiovascular risk information in the 
"Warnings" section, as well as implement a complete ban on a high-dose formulation of 
the drug. Id. 
176 Vioxx Hearing, supra note 170. 
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increased risk attributable to Vioxx was 3. 7 times. 177 This 
translated into approximately 100,000 excess cases of heart 
disease, with almost half of these being fataP 78 
However, these findings almost never became public. Mter 
Dr. Graham first approached his superiors in early August of 
2004 with the results of the study, he was subsequently 
pressured to change his conclusions by senior officials at the 
FDA.179 He was told that as the agency was not contemplating a 
warning against the use of high-dose Vioxx, his contradictory 
recommendations were not acceptable. 180 Additionally, Dr. 
Graham was informed that if he failed to make the necessary 
modifications, he would not be permitted to present the data at 
an upcoming conference at which he was scheduled to speak.181 
Moreover, Dr. Graham was notified by a manager in the Office 
of Drug Safety that he would need to provide his original study 
results to Merck.182 
Eventually, Dr. Graham reluctantly conceded to his 
supervisors' demands by altering the results quite considerably 
in advance of the conference.183 Dr. Graham testified at the 
Senate hearing that he did so ''because [he] thought if [he] did 
not, there would be no way on earth that [the] data would see 
the light of day."184 The FDA's apparent disregard for safety 
concerns and resistance to disclosure would further strengthen 
the growing public sentiment that greater transparency was 
urgently needed in connection with clinical trials. 
177 D. Graham et al., Risk of Acute Myocardial Infarction and Sudden Cardiac Death 
in Patients treated with Cyclo·oxygenase 2 Selective and Non-Selective Non-Steroidal 
Anti-Inflammatory Drugs, 365 LANCET 475,479 (2005). 
178 Id. at 480. See also Vioxx Hearing, supra note 170. 
179 Vioxx Hearing, supra note 170. 
15o Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
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IV. INCREMENTAL MOVEMENT TOWARD GREATER ACCESS TO 
CLINICAL TRIAL INFORMATION 
Scientists and patient advocates have long reported 
substantial difficulties associated with obtaining data 
concerning clinical trials. For more than thirty years, the 
creation of a clinical trial registry which could provide basic 
information regarding ongoing trials had been proposed as a 
partial solution to the problem.185 While the National Institutes 
of Health ("NIH") registered all of the studies it sponsored from 
1975 to 1979, the agency discontinued this policy until the Food 
and Drug Act was amended almost two decades later. 
The Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 
1997 ("FDAMA") mandated the creation of a registry that would 
provide data on clinical trials for serious or life-threatening 
diseases. 186 The statute required the information to be "in a 
form readily understood by members of the public" and include a 
description of the study's purpose, eligibility criteria for 
participation, trial phase, location of study sites, and the drug or 
therapy under investigation.187 Additionally, registration was 
mandatory regardless of whether the trial was publicly or 
privately funded. 188 
In fulfillment of the statutory obligations under the 
FDAMA, the FDA and NIH created the ClinicalTrials.gov 
website. This register, · maintained by the United States 
National Library of Medicine, became operational in early 
2000. 189 Nonetheless, the pharmaceutical industry was 
185 Kay Dickersin & Drummond Rennie, Registering Clinical Trials, 290 JAMA 516, 
516 (2003). 
186 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105·115, 
111 Stat. 2296 (1997). The Act limited the registration requirement to clinical trials 
testing the effectiveness of experimental drugs or biological products, as opposed to trials 
merely studying toxicity. ld. Essentially, this would include all Phase 2, Phase 3, and 
Phase 4 trials that contain efficacy endpoints as part of their study protocol. ld. 
187 ld. 
188 ld. 
189 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: INFORMATION PROGRAM ON 
CLINICAL TRIALS FOR SERIOUS OR LIFE·THREATENING DISEASES AND CONDITIONS 2 
(2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/clintrial031802.pdf. 
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exceptionally resistant to providing the required disclosures. 190 
In clear contravention of the FDAMA's proVIsiOns, the 
pharmaceutical industry stated that it would not pledge to 
register its clinical trials. In a document entitled "Public 
Disclosure of Clinical Trial Results," the drug companies' trade 
group declared that "[s]ponsors do not commit ... to make the 
designs of clinical trial protocols available publicly at inception, 
as in a clinical trials registry."191 
Accordingly, the pharmaceutical industry repeatedly failed 
to comply with the law. For example, a study by FDA staff 
found that less than half of all cancer trials sponsored by drug 
companies required to be registered were actually submitted to 
clinicaltrials.gov, in comparison to more than ninety percent of 
government-funded trials. 192 Another review of ongoing prostate 
and colon cancer clinical trials demonstrated similar 
deficiencies, as only seventeen of the thirty-two trials sponsored 
by industry were registered. 193 For other serious diseases the 
study inclusion rate was even more abysmal, with some in the 
mere single digits. 194 Furthermore, when drug companies 
actually did tender information to the clinicaltrials.gov registry, 
the information provided was often inadequate.195 Including 
meaningless information, such as "investigational drug'' in place 
of the actual name of the medication as required by the statute 
or omitting the sponsor's name, was commonplace.196 
Such a state of affairs was due in large part to the fact that 
there were no negative consequences associated with a trial 
19o Dickersin & Rennie, supra note 185, at 516. 
191 PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., PRINCIPLES ON CONDUCT OF CLINICAL TRlALS 
AND COMMUNICATION OF CLINICAL TRlAL RESULTS (2002). 
192 J. Derbis, et al., FDAMA Section 113: Information Program on Clinical Trials for 
Serious and Life-Threatening Diseases, Ninth Annual Food and Drug Administration 
Science Forum (2003), abstract auailable at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-frflforum03/U-
04.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2009). 
19a Dickersin & Rennie, supra note 185, at 519. 
194 Vedantam, supra note 14, at Al. 
195 Catherine DeAngelis et al., Is This Clinical Trial Fully Registered?-A Statement 
from the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
2436, 2436-38 (2005); Deborah Zarin et al., Issues in the Registration of Clinical Trials, 
297 JAMA 2112, 2115-18 (2007). 
196 Zarin et al., supra note 195, at 2115. 
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sponsor's violation of the FDAMA. The FDA did not require 
companies to register their clinical studies in order to utilize the 
data from the investigations for regulatory approval. 197 
Furthermore, refusal to submit information to the publicly 
accessible ClinicalTrials.gov registry did not lead to any sort of a 
monetary penalty. 
With the anti-depressant and Vioxx controversies as a 
backdrop, there were increasing demands placed on Congress to 
considerably improve the level of transparency in the drug 
approval process and provide greater public access to clinical 
trial information. Consequently, in October of 2004, members in 
both houses of Congress introduced their own versions of the 
Fair Access to Clinical Trials (FACT) Act, which attempted to 
ameliorate many of the inadequacies associated with the 
FDAMA's clinical trial registry provisions.198 Although the bills 
were not identical, they were quite similar, including requiring 
registration of a study as a prerequisite to FDA authorization 
for testing an investigational medication. 199 Additionally, the 
Department of Health and Human Services would have the 
authority to impose civil penalties of $10,000 per day for 
noncompliance.200 Even more significant, both of the bills would 
expand the type of information a drug company would need to 
disclose, most notably through the creation of a new clinical trial 
results database that would contain a modest amount of factual 
material from completed studies.201 
Not surprisingly, the pharmaceutical industry's trade group 
197 This was in stark contrast to an investigator's failure to obtain prior IRB approval 
of research protocols, which could result in an inability to submit the findings from such 
trials to the FDA. See 21 C.F.R. §54.1(b) (2008) and the discussion of the IND process in 
Section III supra. 
198 Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act, H.R. 5252, 108th Cong. (2004); Fair Access to 
Clinical Trials Act, S. 2933, 108th Cong. (2004). 
199 Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act, H.R. 5252; Fair Access to Clincial Trials Act, S. 
2933. See Robert Steinbrook, Registration of Clinical Trials-Voluntary or Mandatory?, 
351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1820 (2004) (providing a detailed analysis of the type of 
information to be included under the Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act). 
200 Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act, H.R. 5252; Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act, S. 
2933. 
201 Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act, H.R. 5252; Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act, S. 
2933. 
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did not support the FACT Act. Originally, the Pharmaceutical 
Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) asserted that 
a results reporting requirement was unnecessary.202 However, 
in January of 2005, faced with pressure from lawmakers, the 
medical community, and the public, the four largest 
pharmaceutical trade groups in the world, including PhRMA, 
released a joint statement on the disclosure of clinical trial 
information.203 While the group members pledged to release a 
nominal amount of information regarding ongoing trials, they 
did not commit to submitting the data to a comprehensive, 
government-sponsored registry.204 Instead, the provisions left 
open the possibility of publishing the information on individual, 
company-sponsored websites that could contain internal rules 
that might not be publicly disclosed and consequently may differ 
from one site to the next. A 2006 study confirmed that the 
potential for abuse of such a system was far from theoretical, 
finding that "when conclusions were listed in these [corporate] 
databases, they tended to be more favorable for the company's 
product than those found in published articles or FDA reviews of 
the same trials."205 Furthermore, with regard to completed 
trials, the pharmaceutical manufacturers agreed only to make 
public "summary results" of the studies and, additionally, 
asserted such disclosure "must maintain protections for ... 
intellectual property and contract rights."206 Most problematic, 
however, was the fact that adherence to the proposed guidelines 
was completely voluntary. 
Ultimately, neither version of the FACT Act of 2004 was 
202 See, e.g., Barry Meier, Contracts Keep Drug Research Out of Reach, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 29, 2004, at Al (reporting on the pharmaceutical industry's response to the 
proposed legislation). 
203 INT'L FED'N OF PHARM. MFR. & AsS'N, GLOBAL INDUSTRY POSITION ON DISCLOSURE 
OF INFORMATION ABOUT CLINICAL TRIALS (2005), available at 
http://clinicaltrials.ifpma.org/fileadmin/flles/pdfs/EN/CTP _Release_Joint_Position_EN.pd 
f. The statement included trade groups from the United States, Japan, as well as 
Europe. Id. 
204 Id. 
20s Zarin et al., supra note 195, at 2118. 
206 INT'L FED'N OF PHARM. MFR. & AsS'N, JOINT POSITION ON THE DISCLOSURE OF 
CLINICAL TRIAL INFORMATION VIA CLINICAL TRIAL REGISTRIES AND DATABASES (2005), 
available at http://en.sanofi.aventis.com/binaries/050106_release_en_tcm28-21769.pdf. 
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enacted as both bills did not succeed in making it out of 
committee. Over the next few years, a number of comparable 
bills were introduced in the House and Senate, 207 as well as a 
few alternative proposals;208 nevertheless they all met a similar 
fate. However, in 2007, with a substantial FDA funding 
program209 set to expire that had dramatically reduced the 
review time of drug applications to the major benefit of the 
pharmaceutical companies, consumer groups and the medical 
community began to advocate for other provisions to be added to 
the reauthorization bill in order to improve drug safety. As a 
result, the push for the creation of a clinical trial results 
database increasingly gained momentum, and it soon became 
clear that the pharmaceutical industry would likely need to 
concede to at least some level of disclosure. 
On May 9, 2007, the Senate passed the Food and Drug 
Administration Revitalization Act,210 containing clinical trial 
results database provisions adopted from a bill introduced 
earlier in the year, the Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation 
Act of 2007.211 On June 28, 2007, the House of Representatives 
passed its own reauthorization bill, the Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act of 2007.212 The portion of the 
legislation pertaining to study results, although far from ideal, 
did contain some significant improvements over the Senate's 
version that certainly strengthened the bill. Unfortunately, 
under pressure from the pharmaceutical lobby, the final 
compromise legislation approved by both houses of Congress and 
eventually enacted into law removed most of these 
enhancements. Ultimately, the clinical trial results database 
provisions failed to impart the critical transparency necessary to 
2o1 Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act, H.R. 3196, 109th Cong. (2005); Fair Access t
Clinical Trials Act, S. 470, 109th Cong. (2005); Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act, S. 467
lllth Cong. (2007). 
2os See, e.g., Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act, S. 3807, llOth Cong. (2006);
Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act, S. 3807, lllth Cong. (2007). 
2o9 See infra Part VIII discussing the arguably problematic conflict of interest create
by this program. 
21o Food and Drug Administration Revitalization Act, S. 1082, lllth Cong. (2007). 
211 Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act, S. 484, lllth Cong. (2007). 
212 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act, H.R. 2900, lllth Cong. (2007). 
o 
, 
 
d 
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provide meaningful reform to the clinical trial process and thus 
adequately protect the public. 
V. DEFICIENCIES OF THE FEDERAL CLINICAL TRIALS RESULTS 
DATABASE REQUIREMENTS 
On September 27, 2007, the Food and Drug Administration 
Amendments Act (FDAAA) became law.213 With regard to the 
clinical trials registry portion of the Act, the statute did achieve 
some limited success. A number of the major shortcomings 
associated with the Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act's ("FDAMA") clinical trial registry were 
remedied. Of particular significance was the fact that monetary 
penalties could now be assessed for the failure to register an 
applicable clinical trial.214 Additionally, the provisions were 
changed so that clinical trials related to all conditions, not 
merely those studies pertaining to serious or life-threatening 
diseases, now had to be registered.215 Nonetheless, several 
anticipated modifications were not instituted.216 
The FDAAA also required the Secretary of Health and 
21a Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. Law No. 110-85, 
121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended at 21 USC§§ 301 et seq.). 
4 21 See Section IV supra discussing the inadequacies of the FDAMA's clinical trial 
registry provisions. The statute now provides for monetary penalties in the amount of 
$10,000 for all violations adjudicated in a single proceed. 21 U.S.C. §333 (2006 & Supp. 
2008). However, to the extent a violation is not corrected within the thirty-day period 
following notification of non-compliance, an additional fine of $10,000 per day may be 
assessed until such problem is corrected. Id. 
215 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(1)(A)(iii)(l) (2006 & Supp. 2008) (defining an "applicable drug 
clinical trial"). 
12 6 One important change not made was an amendment to require that all 
submissions of registration information conform to the International Clinical Trials 
Registry Platform trial registration data set of the World Health Organization developed 
in 2004. This worldwide uniform standard contains a twenty-item minimum data set. 
See WORLD HEALTH 0RG., INTERNATIONAL CLINICAL TRlALS REGISTRY PLATFORM, 
available at http://www.who.int/ictrp/en/. Ironically, compliance with the standard was 
originally included in both of the bills passed in the House and Senate, but was removed 
as part of the compromise legislation eventually enacted into law, omitting several of the 
mandatory categories of information. Additionally, another modification that would 
have appreciably strengthened the clinical trials registry would be to require Phase I 
trials to be listed. See infra Part VII further examining the importance of incorporating 
these early trials. 
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Human Services ("Secretary") to expand the clinicaltrials.gov 
registry to include results of clinical trials for the first time. 217 
While this portion of the Act was generally heralded by 
Congress as a major triumph for public safety, 218 in reality it 
appears to be more of a victory for the pharmaceutical industry. 
A closer look at the statutory language demonstrates the 
legislation as currently configured requires minimal disclosure 
and continues to allow drug companies to maintain a shroud of 
secrecy surrounding the vast majority of clinical trial result 
information. 
A. The First Stage of Controlled Disclosure 
The statute is essentially configured to disclose particular 
categories of information in successive stages. The initial stage 
requires that not later than ninety days after the enactment of 
the FDAAA, the Secretary must ensure links have been created 
from the ClinicalTrials.gov registry to a very narrow grouping of 
result information.219 This includes any public health advisories 
issued by the FDA regarding the drug that is the subject of the 
clinical trial and any previously published FDA summary 
documents resulting from an advisory committee meeting that 
considered the research study.220 Additionally, this requirement 
generally only pertains to Phase III or the typically voluntary 
post-approval studies conducted by drug manufactures in 
consultation with the FDA, also known as Phase IV clinical 
trials. 221 Furthermore, such links need not be established any 
earlier than thirty days after the date the drug is approved or 
prior to thirty days after the specified data has become publicly 
available by other means.222 The ultimate effect of these 
exceptionally restrictive provisions is to merely provide an 
additional website location to access this extraordinarily limited 
211 42 § 282G)(3) (2006 & Supp. 2008). 
21a See Section I supra discussing the inaccurate portrayal of the Act by its sponsors. 
219 § 282G)(3). 
220 § 282G)(3)(A)(ii). 
221 § 282G)(3)(A)(iii) ("those clinical trials that form the primary basis of an efficacy 
claim or are conducted after the drug involved is approved"). 
222 § 282G)(3)(A)(i). 
u.s.c. 
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amount of previously obtainable information.223 While this 
might theoretically allow individuals to retrieve the relevant 
material more easily, it certainly does not obligate the drug 
industry to divulge any unattainable results information. 
B. The Second Stage of Controlled Disclosure 
The second stage of data disclosure is set to occur no later 
than one year after the enactment of the statute. 224 By this time 
frame, the Secretary must further expand the clinical trial 
results database to contain additional information. Material to 
be incorporated includes rudimentary demographic baseline 
characteristics of the patients participating in the study.225 This 
must also include the number of individuals who dropped out of 
the clinical trial.226 Disappointingly, no information need be 
provided as to the reason for withdrawing, which could furnish 
potentially valuable insight as to possible problems associated 
with the intervention. 
Further, very basic data concerning the primary and 
secondary outcome measures must also be submitted.227 
Moreover, the existence of an agreement which restricts the 
ability of the principal investigator ("PI") to publicly discuss the 
results of the trial after its completion needs to be divulged.228 
Unfortunately, this obligation is narrowed significantly by its 
failure to include persons other than the PI. Drug companies 
frequently utilize medical schools with their academic scientists 
and teaching hospital personnel to run clinical trials229 which 
would not be included in this disclosure. Moreover, this 
requirement is inapplicable if the PI is also an employee of the 
22a Virtually all of this information would have previously been made available on the 
FDA or National Institutes of Health's own publicly accessible Internet website. 
224 § 282G)(3)(C). 
22s § 282(j)(3)(C)(i). 
22s Id. 
7 22 § 282(j)(3)(C)(ii). Outcome measures in a clinical trial involving a new drug for the 
treatment of early-stage breast cancer might for example include the number of 
participants who were diagnosed with a recurrence of their breast cancer as a primary 
outcome and then the number of patients who ultimately died as a secondary outcome. 
22s § 282(j)(3)(C)(iv)(2008). 
22s Meier, supra note 202, at Al. 
HeinOnline -- 78 Miss. L.J. 743 2008-2009
744 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78.4 
sponsor. As it is not unusual for industry-sponsored trials to 
designate one of their in-house scientific researchers to be the 
PI, this requirement is far from adequate.230 
Even more problematic, however, is the fact these already 
limited disclosures do not pertain to those later studies 
involving drugs that ultimately fail to receive FDA approval.231 
This is exceptionally troubling as failure to integrate clinical 
trial results data from studies on a drug that is ultimately not 
approved will severely impact the quantity of information made 
available to the general public. Even by the pharmaceutical 
industry's own estimates, only twenty percent of investigational 
medications successfully complete all three phases of the clinical 
testing process and consequently become the subject of a New 
Drug Application.232 Moreover, not all of these pharmaceuticals 
will actually obtain FDA approval.233 As a result, the overall 
number of trials potentially subject to this second round of 
possible disclosures is exceedingly small. 
Additionally, the statutory provisions further narrow this 
already extremely limited group of clinical trials by also 
providing that results from Phase I trials need not be 
submitted. 234 This is quite disconcerting as releasing such 
details is essential to ensuring future patient safety. This is 
well illustrated by the case involving TGN1412, a monoclonal 
antibody developed by drug manufacturer TeGenero that was 
230 It should also be pointed out that this provision would not provide any sort of 
assistance to individuals such as Dr. Mosholder and Dr. Graham as they are employees 
of the FDA. Furthermore, this disclosure requirement is only with regard to "applicable 
clinical trials," which as defined by the Act applies solely to prospective clinical trials, 
not the sort of retroactive review studies conducted by Dr. Mosholder and Dr. Graham of 
anti-depressants and Vioxx respectively. Interestingly, the FDAAA also contained a 
section concerning policies on the review and clearance of scientific articles by FDA 
employees, which continues to allow for the agency to potentially exercise significant 
control. See 21 U.S.C § 379 (2006 & Supp. 2008). 
231 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(3)(C) (2006 & Supp. 2008). 
232 U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 42, at 7. 
233 Id. (explaining that the percentage of applications that are ultimately denied 
approval is approximately twenty-five percent) 
4 23 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(1)(A)(iii)(l) (2006 & Supp. 2008) (defining applicable drug 
clinical as a "controlled clinical investigation, other than a phase I clinical investigation 
of a drug subject to section 355 of Title 21 or to section 262 of this title."). 
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thought could potentially benefit individuals suffering from 
multiple sclerosis or rheumatoid arthritis.235 Six healthy 
volunteers enrolled in the study were to be the first humans to 
receive the treatment. However, within a few hours after 
administration of the drug, all of the participants began 
experiencing multiple-organ failure and were quickly 
transferred to an intensive care unit. Although every individual 
survived the incident, some of the study volunteers remained 
hospitalized for up to three months. By failing to include results 
data from all trial phases, it is quite possible another 
pharmaceutical company might unknowingly repeat previous 
mistakes in studies of the same or similar medication, thereby 
needlessly placing patients at significant risk for substantial 
harm. 
The overall impact of these restrictions is the number of 
clinical trials subject to these disclosure requirements is 
exceedingly small. Consequently, this has a dramatic impact on 
the amount of information that pharmaceutical companies need 
make publicly accessible. As such, this statutory section does 
not lead to anything approaching meaningful change in terms of 
the depth or breadth of significant clinical trial results data that 
must be revealed 
C. The Third Stage of Controlled Disclosure 
The third and final stage of expansion of the results 
database is exceptionally unsettled. The only information that 
must definitively be revealed are the elements included in the 
prior stage.236 This is due to the fact that instead of specifying 
any additional disclosure obligations, the Act directs the 
Secretary to expand the results database through regulation not 
later than three years· from the enactment date of the Act.237 In 
connection therewith, the statute requires that a public meeting 
235 See, e.g., Alistair J.J. Wood & Janet Darbyshire, Injury to Research Volunteers­
The Clinical-Research Nightmare, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1869 (2006). 
236 42 U.S.C. § 282G)(3)(D)(iii) (2006 & Supp. 2008) (''The regulations under this 
subparagraph shall require, in addition to the elements described in subparagraph (C) .. 
.. ) 
237 § 282G)C3)(D)(i). 
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be held no later than eighteen months after the date of 
enactment "to provide an opportunity for input from interested 
parties."238 As such, this would undoubtedly seem to allow for 
significant input from drug companies in shaping the clinical 
trial results information to be divulged under this provision of 
the FDAAA. In fact, an earlier Senate version of the Act made 
participation in further negotiated rule making explicit, 
requiring the formation of a committee that mandated the 
inclusion of members representing the pharmaceutical 
industry.239 
The Act stipulates that the final regulations promulgated 
must include a summary of the clinical trial and its results 
written in non-technical language that is understandable to the 
general public, as well as an additional scientific summary 
appropriate for researchers and medical professionals.240 
Nevertheless, such disclosures are only necessary if the 
Secretary determines these summaries can be communicated in 
a manner that is not misleading or promotional in nature. 241 
Concerns have been raised that such narratives might provide 
an opportunity for those entities with vested interests in the 
manner in which the results are depicted to provide a biased 
spin on the way the data is portrayed.242 Consequently, the Act 
provides that, if the Secretary ultimately concludes this is not 
possible, the disclosures will not be required.243 However, an 
argument can be made that these lay summaries are essential to 
ensuring patients have access to understandable information 
regarding clinical trials, as well as provide a form of 
acknowledgement to the risks study volunteers take by 
participating in the research studies.244 As a result, the solution 
23s § 282G)(3)(D)(vii). 
239 Food and Drug Administration Revitalization Act, S. 1082, 111th Cong. (2007). 
24o § 282 G)(3)(D)(iii)(l-II). 
241 Id. 
242 See e.g. Zarin et al., supra note 195, at 2115-18. 
243 § 282G)(3)(D)(iii)(l-II). 
42 4 Aneel Damle et al., A Policy Study of Clinical Trial Registries and Results 
Databases (2007), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7534&seciD=1656&catiD=126. 
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is not to prohibit the summaries altogether, but ensure the 
ability to access the raw data to audit the information contained 
within the narrative, as well as provide a mechanism to make 
any necessary changes. 
Similarly, an additional provision initially appears to 
compel the creation of a regulation calling for the submission of 
the entire clinical trial protocol for public review. 245 However, 
this obligation is further weakened since an option exists to 
limit this solely to such protocol information necessary "to help 
to evaluate the results of the trial."246 As a result, it is quite 
possible that very little information will actually be 
disseminated. 
To the extent the regulations introduced by the Secretary 
provide for further disclosure of clinical trial results, such new 
rules only pertain to specific studies. Similar to previous 
sections, Phase I studies are not included.247 Moreover, 
although the Act requires that results information from all 
investigations involving an FDA-approved medication be listed 
on the expanded ClinicalTrials.gov website, data from studies 
concerning pharmaceuticals that do not ultimately receive FDA­
approval, regardless of whether authorization was sought, may 
not necessarily need to be publicly divulged. 248 This is due to the 
fact that instead of requiring these trials to be included at the 
outset, the Act instead provides the Secretary with the 
discretion to later determine whether or not to incorporate such 
studies into the publicly accessible database.249 Again, as 
discussed above, since the vast majority of drugs fail to obtain 
FDA-approval, excluding all clinical trials of unapproved 
medications will provide pharmaceutical companies with the 
ability to continue concealing enormous amounts of information 
from the public. 
Furthermore, the timeline for the actual dissemination of 
these trial results to the public is potentially quite lengthy. 
245 § 282(j)(3)(D)(iii)(III). 
246 Id. 
247 § 282(j)(l)(A)(iii)(l). 
248 § 282(j)(3)(D)(ii)(I·II). 
249 § 282(j)(3)(D)(ii)(II). 
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Although the Act initially provides that submission of clinical 
trial data must occur no later than one year after the earlier of 
the estimated or actual completion date of the trial, there are 
some significant exceptions.250 The statute allows data 
submissions to be delayed for a trial involving a previously 
approved drug that is undergoing testing for new, additional 
uses not currently part of the medication's labeling.251 This 
would include, for example, the various clinical studies 
investigating the use of the antidepressant Paxil in pediatric 
populations or Merck's APPROVe trial examining whether 
Vioxx was effective in preventing colon polyps. As long as the 
pharmaceutical manufacturer intends to file an application 
seeking approval for the new use within one year and tenders 
the requisite certification attesting to such plans, the 
information need not be submitted until thirty days following 
the earlier of FDA approval of the new use, agency denial of the 
application, or the withdrawal of the application if not 
resubmitted within 210 days. 252 However, if one of these three 
actions has not occurred prior to two years from the date the 
extension was requested, the data must immediately be 
submitted.253 The ultimate effect of the interaction between 
these various subsections of the Act is that data required to be 
disclosed regarding these clinical trials investigating off-label 
uses most likely will not become publicly available for 
approximately three years after the study is completed.254 
Clearly, the past controversies have illustrated that allowing 
clinical trial results data on off-label uses to be suppressed for 
250 § 282G)(3)(E)(i). It should be noted that this stipulated time frame could 
potentially be extended slightly as the Secretary has the power under the Act to increase 
the period for submission to eighteen months by regulation. See § 282G)(3)(D)(iv)(I). 
251 § 282G)(3)(E)(v). 
252 Id. 
253 42 U.S.C. § 282G)(3)(E)(v)(III) (2006 & Supp. 2008). 
254 This figure is calculated by adding the one·year time frame for the typical 
submission time, plus the approximate length of time it would take to obtain drug 
approval, denial of an application, or the two.year limitation period from when the 
certification is filed. So long as said certification is filed less than a year from the 
completion date of the study in question (or the expected completion date), the applicant 
would not appear to be out of compliance. 
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such a protracted period of time is completely unacceptable, as it 
continues to facilitate a system that does not adequately protect 
public safety. 
Delays in submission of study results are also allowed for 
another category of trials, namely clinical investigations 
completed before the drug is initially approved.255 With regard 
to such pre-approval studies, the statute allows the deadline to 
be extended until thirty days following the drug's approval 
date. 256 In light of the fact that all three phases of the clinical 
trial process generally take seven years to complete and the 
agency's application review process can typically be expected to 
last almost two years,257 the duration of postponement permitted 
for release of the data, particularly from some of the earlier 
applicable trials, is nothing short of astonishing. 
D. Further Weaknesses of the Act 
Aside from the numerous special exceptions already 
articulated, the FDAAA also allows the Director of the National 
Institutes of Health to grant extensions to the second and third 
stage data submission requirements. 258 The only restriction on 
the Director's ability to provide relief from these disclosure 
obligations is that a request must demonstrate "good cause;" 
however, this term is not defined.259 Additionally, the provision 
does not contain any sort of limitation on the permissible length 
of such an extension. Moreover, the Director is allowed to grant 
more than one extension for a particular clinical triai.260 While 
some flexibility may be desirable, such an unnecessarily broad 
provision leaves open the potential for abuse. 
Another serious shortcoming of the Act is its failure to 
specify at the outset the adverse event reporting requirements. 
Instead, this subject is left to be addressed through future 
255 § 282(j)(3)(E)(iv). 
256 Id. 
257 U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 42, at 7. 
25s § 282(j)(3)(E)(vi). 
259 Id. 
260 Id. 
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regulation by the Secretary.261 In the event the Secretary fails 
to issue such regulations within twenty-four months of the 
FDAAA's enactment, the statute does provide a series of default 
provisions, which will then go into effect.262 However, 
considering the import of this type of information to other 
investigators who may be conducting clinical trials utilizing 
identical or similar interventions, physicians responsible for 
appropriately advising their patients, and the safety of the 
general public, these provisions should not have been left for 
future elaboration. 
Similarly, the Act fails to stipulate a method for verifying 
the accuracy of the information that is submitted by study 
sponsors in accordance with the statute's various disclosure 
provisions.263 As this is left to future regulation by the 
Secretary,264 it is unclear how rigorous a process this ultimately 
may be in the end. However, procedures allowing for careful 
analysis of data provided in accordance with the Act are critical 
to ensuring necessary transparency. 
Additionally, while not necessarily constituting a 
shortcoming of the FDAAA per se, it is worth noting that the Act 
also preempted all state provisions relating to the registration of 
clinical trials or the disclosure of study results in a database. 265 
While over the last several years many states have introduced 
legislation concerning clinical trials, only Maine has succeeded 
in passing such a law.266 The Maine state statute required that 
pharmaceutical companies make publicly accessible 
"[i]nformation concerning the results of the clinical trial, 
including potential or actual adverse effects of the drug'' for all 
studies involving medications distributed in Maine.267 While the 
exact contours of this provision would seem to have necessitated 
further rulemaking by the Maine Department of Health and 
261 § 282(j)(3)(I). 
262 ld. 
263 § 282(j)(3)(D)(v)(III). 
264 Id. 
265 § 282(j). 
266 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2700-A (2007). 
267 § 2700-A(3). 
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Human Services as afforded under the statute,268 it is quite 
possible that the Maine state law could have potentially 
required significantly greater disclosure than the federal 
statute. However, as a result of the preemption provision, the 
possibility of correcting the deficiencies of the federal law 
indirectly through state legislation is foreclosed. Consequently, 
further strengthening of the FDAAA disclosure requirements 
must therefore now come in the form of regulations issued by 
the Secretary or amendments to the statute by Congress. 
Nevertheless, any attempt to expand the type or amount of 
results information to be publicly revealed will unquestionably 
meet strong resistance from the pharmaceutical industry. 
VI. OPPOSITION TO DISCLOSURE 
Pharmaceutical companies have been exceptionally 
resistant to mandatory requirements to publicly reveal clinical 
trial materials, particularly results data. The drug industry has 
typically taken the position that if they are paying for an 
investigational study, the data generated unquestionably 
belongs to them. 269 Moreover, as the purported owners of the 
information, they should be entitled to control its disclosure. 
This stance is further reflected in PhRMA's position paper 
entitled Principles on Conduct of Clinical Trials and 
Communication of Clinical Trial Results, which succinctly 
provides: "As owners of the study database, sponsors have 
discretion to determine who will have access."270 
The pharmaceutical industry has asserted a wide range of 
proprietary-based rationales for such viewpoints. Often this 
includes arguments sounding in trade secret, contract, and 
patent law. Additionally, drug manufacturers maintain that the 
268 § 2700-A(7). 
269 See e.g., Meier, supra note 202, at Al. 
270 PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., PRINCIPLES ON CONDUCT OF CLINICAL TRIALS 
AND COMMUNICATION OF CLINICAL TRIAL RESULTS 21 (2004) [hereinafter PHRMA 
PRINCIPLES]. The document also declares that "[e]ven the fact that an exploratory study 
is being conducted may be highly proprietary because it reflects a company's choices to 
pursue certain research strategies, to test various methods of clinical trial design, and/or 
to utilize certain endpoint measures." Id. 
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ability to control clinical trial data is a competitive necessity, 
without which innovation would likely decrease to society's 
detriment. Furthermore, as much of the information is technical 
in nature, drug companies contend that releasing trial results to 
the general public is not only unlikely to be helpful, but could in 
fact lead to significant patient confusion or unwarranted 
concern. However, a closer look at these positions demonstrates 
their many weaknesses. 
A. Trade Secrets 
When the public began demanding further details 
concerning clinical trials involving the use of antidepressants in 
the pediatric population, the pharmaceutical makers refused.271 
Instead, they claimed the study results could not be released 
because they constituted trade secrets.272 The FDA has also 
generally supported this line of reasoning.273 The agency's 
longstanding policy is to treat information generated in 
connection with clinical trials as trade secrets.274 Nonetheless, 
the FDA has indicated its hesitation about doing so. 
The agency has testified on numerous occasions before 
Congress that federal law as currently drafted prohibits the 
dissemination of "useful information contained in the agency's 
files, and particularly, data relating to the safety and 
effectiveness of drugs."275 Furthermore, the FDA has asserted 
that "[e]ven if such disclosure would be in the public interest, in 
order to protect the public health, and even if the Commissioner 
wishes as a matter of discretion to release such material, such 
disclosure cannot lawfully be undertaken."276 Consequently, the 
agency is "bound by the present provisions until Congress 
acts."277 
271 Shankar Vedantam, Antidepressant Makers Withhold Data on Children, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 29, 2004, at Al. 
212 Id. 
273 Availability of Records and Information, 42 Fed. Reg. 3,094 (Jan. 14, 1977). 
274 Jd. 
275 Freedom of Information Act, 39 Fed. Reg. 44,602; 44,612 (Dec. 24, 1974). 
21s Jd. 
211 Jd. 
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However, it is not entirely clear that the statutory language 
invoked in support of this position actually provides for the 
claimed interpretation. 278 Trade secrecy proponents have 
generally relied on§ 301(j) of the FDCA which prohibits the use 
of any information acquired in connection with the FDA 
approval process "concerning any method or process which as a 
trade secret is entitled to protection."279 But a compelling 
argument can be made that clinical trial data does not actually 
constitute a "method or process."280 Nonetheless, it may be 
unfeasible to adopt a more narrow interpretation of the 
statutory language at this stage in light of the FDA's established 
practice. 281 
Yet characterizing clinical trial data as a trade secret may 
be analytically difficult for still another reason. A fundamental 
tenet of trade secret law is that protection exists only as long as 
the information is kept confidential. The very nature of a 
clinical trial is quite public in many respects, making 
maintenance of complete secrecy fairly difficult.282 Large 
numbers of human subjects are often involved and generally not 
restricted in their ability to communicate about their 
experiences, including adverse events. As a result, information 
that might be initially characterized as potentially sensitive is 
often readily obtainable. For example "detailed pipeline 
information on interventions and research from the preclinical 
phase to the market phase is already available through various 
subscription websites."283 Furthermore, data on most late-phase 
drug trials is effectively in the public domain at the present time 
through academic presentations at scientific meetings.284 
Disclosure of clinical trial data often also occurs in rather 
278 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 380 (2007). 
279 Jd.(citing Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act§ 301, 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2000)). 
2ao Id. 
281 Id. 
282 A Prescription for Better Drug Trials, 41 TRIAL 54, 55 (2005). 
2sa Karmela et al, supra note 20, at 956; see also Ida Sim et al., Clinical Trial 
Registration: Transparency is the Watchword, 367 LANCET 1631, 1631 (2006). 
284 Gerd Antes and lain Chalmers, Under·reporting of Clinical Trials is Unethical, 
361 LANCET 978 (2003) 
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unexpected ways. For example, numerous reports have surfaced 
that preferred customers of Wall Street brokerage houses and 
hedge funds are frequently given access to clinical trial data, 
which is then used to make investment decisions. 285 While such 
practices were investigated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission as potentially violating insider trading laws, the 
actions would also potentially extinguish any purported trade 
secret protection. 286 The conclusion that ultimately can be 
drawn is the drug industry's supposedly fail-safe argument 
regarding clinical trial data constituting trade secrets, is overall 
quite specious. 
B. Contracts 
Drug companies frequently rely on contracts in order to 
assert rights to the information collected in a clinical trial, as 
well as exercise virtually complete control over any 
communications related to the study data. It is not unusual for 
pharmaceutical makers to include in agreements with research 
scientists, and medical school personnel conducting the 
investigations on their behalf, a requirement that all data be 
maintained confidentially. Furthermore, these restrictions also 
usually include prohibitions on a researcher's ability to discuss 
the results of the trial publicly or even privately, as well as 
publish articles related to the study results. 
While some academic institutions have opposed such 
constraints, for example Yale University will not accept any 
restrictions on publication with the exception of a short 
postponement to allow for a patent application or license, these 
entities are clearly in the minority. 287 In fact, the authors of a 
survey exammmg agreements between medical schools and 
industry sponsors found that "academic institutions rarely 
285 SEC Investigating Reports of Leaks of Clinical Trial Data, 24 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. 
REP. 743, 743 (2005). 
28& Id. 
287 YALE UNIVERSITY, YALE UNIVERSITY FACULTY HANDBOOK 112 (2002), available at 
http://www.yale.edu/provostlhandbook/faculty_handbook.pdf; see also Susan Haack, 
Scientific Secrecy and "Spin'~· The Sad, Sleazy Saga of the Trials of Remune, 69 LAw & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (2006) further discussing such examples. 
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ensure that their investigators have full participation in the 
design of the trials, unimpeded access to trial data, and the right 
to publish their findings." 288 Furthermore, a study of 
approximately 100 academic institutions found that only twelve 
percent of the universities specified limits on permissible delays 
in publication.289 Drug companies often claim the contracts are 
not intended to suppress possibly negative trial findings, but to 
ensure data is properly analyzed before it is released.290 
Nonetheless, this has not proven to always be the 
pharmaceutical industry's practice. For example, in connection 
with the pediatric antidepressant controversy, the only 
published article regarding a placebo controlled trial had 
concluded that the antidepressant under study was found to be 
safe and effective in treating adolescent depression.291 However, 
there were four other similar trials with negative results that 
were never published.292 Researchers who did have access to the 
data from these industry-sponsored trials were prohibited from 
publishing or speaking about the information because of the 
nondisclosure proVIsiOns contained in their contracts. 293 
Although they may have wanted to alert the public regarding 
the potential for harm from these drugs, the researchers were 
not allowed to issue such warnings. 
In another case involving the experimental HIV drug 
Remune, the manufacturer filed an arbitration proceeding 
attempting to prevent the publication of an article by two 
academic researchers involved in clinical trials of the medication 
and sought millions of dollars in damages.294 The company, 
288 Kevin A. Schulman et al., A National Survey of Provisions in Clinical-Trial 
Agreements Between Medical Schools and Industry Sponsors, 374 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 
1335, 1339 (2002). 
289 Mildred K. Cho et al., Policies on Faculty Conflicts of Interest at U.S. Universities, 
284 JAMA 2203, 2203 (2000). 
290 Meier, supra note 202, at Al. 
291 E. Jane Garland, Facing the Evidence: Antidepressant Treatment in Children and 
Adolescents, 170 CAN. MED. Ass'N. J. 489, 489-91 (2004). 
292 Id. 
293 Id. 
294 In re Immune Response Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 983, 994 (S.D. Cal. 2005) 
(class action lawsuit brought by shareholders of the Immune Response Company 
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Immune Response, claimed the manuscript contained 
confidential clinical trial data owned by the drug maker, as well 
as failed to include positive information and comments from the 
research sponsor, in violation of the parties' contract. 
Nonetheless, The Journal of the American Medical Association 
went ahead with its scheduled publication of the piece, in which 
the authors concluded that clinical trials demonstrated Remune 
was ineffective. 295 The company publicly labeled the findings 
inaccurate, characterizing the JAMA article as "tabloid 
journalism," and promising that "the truth in the long run will 
come out."296 However, in the end the results of the private 
arbitration proceedings were kept quiet, although it was 
reported that Immune Response was not awarded any damages 
in its action against the researches.297 
It is impossible to determine how often disputes over 
control of clinical trial data occur between the companies that 
fund the studies and the researchers that conduct the trials. 
While anecdotal evidence suggests such controversies over 
publication may be quite common298, researchers "so seldom 
stand up to their sponsors."299 As a result, "there is no way to 
know how many negative studies have been suppressed-or 
worse, how many negative studies were converted to 
positives."300 
While agreements delaying or preventing publication in all 
discussing the arbitration proceedings); see also Barry Meier, Medicine's Data Gap: The 
Academic Connection, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at Al. 
295 James 0. Kahn, et al., Evaluation of HIV-1 Immunogen, an Immunologic 
Modifier, Administered to Patients Infected With HIV Having 300 to 549 x 106/L CD4 
Cell Counts 284 JAMA 2193, 2193 (2000). 
296 In re Immune Response Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 983, 994 (S.D. Cal. 2005). 
297 Zilch for Maker in AIDS Drug Suit, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 11, 2001, at A10. 
298 See Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance-Clinical Investigators and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry (2006), available at 
http://www.heall.com/healingnews/may/clinical_investigators_and_pharmaceutical_indu 
stry.html. 
299 Katherine S. Mangan, Company Seeks $10 Million from Scientist and University, 
CHRON. HIGHER Eo. Nov. 17, 2000, at A48, A50 (quoting Marcia Angell, Editor-in-Chief 
of the New England Journal of Medicine). 
300 Id. 
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likelihood are enforceable from a contractual formation 
standpoint, a strong argument can be made that they should not 
be enforceable on public policy grounds. These agreements 
essentially create a contractual gag order on information that 
may be vital to society's health and safety. Accordingly, an 
earlier version of the federal clinical trial results database bill 
that eventually became law prohibited a drug manufacturer 
from entering into a contract that prohibited or limited the 
ability of an individual to either discuss the findings of a clinical 
trial or publish the results.301 Unfortunately, this provision was 
removed and replaced with a very weakly worded requirement 
to disclose merely the existence of such an agreement in a very 
narrow range of cases.302 Despite the fact that Congress has 
failed to significantly restrain the use of these types of 
agreements, it still may be possible for the courts to provide 
some much needed constraints and send a strong signal to 
entities that insist on the inclusion and adherence to such data 
control provisions by clinical researchers. 
C. Patents 
With regard to patent protection, the pharmaceutical 
companies' arguments against disclosure of clinical trial results 
data are of a slightly different type. While drug companies' 
overriding concerns with trade secrets and contracts have been 
that the dissemination of study data would be a violation of such 
already established rights, pharmaceutical companies have 
maintained that the publication of trial information could have a 
negative effect on their ability to actually obtain patent 
protection in the first place. Pharmaceutical manufacturers 
claim that if a competitor were to gain access to this material, 
the rival could then utilize the data for its own patent 
applications, thus hindering their chances of even acquiring this 
form of intellectual property protection.303 The drug industry 
contends that such "free riding'' would ultimately impact efforts 
301 Fair Access to Clinical Trials Act, S. 470, 109th Cong. (2005). 
302 See 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(3)(C) (Supp. 2008). 
303 COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 3, at 14. 
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to commercialize the medications being tested, thereby reducing 
their incentives for undertaking original scientific research. 304 
Consequently, they say this would lead to a decline in 
innovation to the detriment of society. 305 However, in light of 
the exceptionally aggressive patenting practices of the drug 
industry, as well as statutory changes to the law, these concerns 
are not especially convincing. 
1. A Pharmaceutical Patent Portfolio 
A patent typically provides its owner with the right to 
exclude others from making, using, or selling an invention for 
twenty years from the date of filing an application for such 
protection.306 Despite the drug industry's claims that public 
access to clinical trial results data could jeopardize their 
capacity to acquire patent protection, the fact of the matter is 
that most pharmaceutical manufacturers have submitted their 
patent applications well before any clinical trial data involving 
human subjects would have actually been generated. More often 
than not, drug companies file for patent protection while the 
investigational drug compound is still in its earliest, preclinical 
testing stage. 307 
Such strategies do, however, create a different problem for 
the pharmaceutical companies. By filing so early in the drug 
development process, the patent could potentially expire even 
before the drug at issue could be commercially distributed. This 
is due to the fact that the intervals between patent issuance, 
clinical trial investigations, and finally FDA approval can be 
quite lengthy. However, in 1984 Congress passed the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (the "Hatch­
Waxman Act"), which attempted to provide a partial solution to 
the pharmaceutical industry's concerns. In order to account for 
the delay, the statute afforded patent holders the right to extend 
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
306 35 u.s.c. § 154 (2006). 
307 See generally, U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 42; Eisenberg, supra 
note 278. 
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their patents for up to five years, so long as the total time 
outstanding on the restored patent following FDA approval did 
not exceed fourteen years. 308 This change significantly reduced 
the likelihood that a pharmaceutical manufacturer would finally 
obtain FDA approval to market a drug and subsequently find 
that no sizeable period of time remained on the patent. 
It is also worth noting that the drug industry is generally 
quite proficient at utilizing the patent system to obtain 
protection. It is not unusual for a single medication to be under 
multiple patents for various aspects of the underlying invention 
including its composition, a method of using the drug, and the 
process for manufacturing the pharmaceutical. 309 Furthermore, 
pharmaceutical companies have recently employed a wide 
variety of "evergreening'' strategies to artificially extend the 
date a medication officially goes off-patent.310 The combination 
of these tactics often allows a drug company to attain a 
dominant position in the marketplace, despite concerns to the 
contrary.311 
2. ANDAs: Opening the Door to Generics 
Prior to the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic 
pharmaceutical companies faced significant obstacles in 
entering the marketplace. In order to receive FDA approval, the 
generic firms were required to conduct their own clinical trials 
to support a new drug application. This was due to the fact that 
the FDA considered these generic versions of previously 
approved drugs "new drugs" themselves, thus necessitating 
evidence demonstrating the product's safety and efficacy.312 
However, the costs associated with testing were exceptionally 
high, and the opportunity to recover such expenses was limited. 
308 35 § 156 (2006). 
309 See Eileen M. Kane, Molecules and Conflict: Cancer, Patents, and Women's Health, 
15 AM. U.J. GENDER Soc. POL 'y & L. 305 (2007) (examining various formats for patenting 
pharmaceuticals). 
13 0 Eisenberg, supra note 278, at 348·49. 
311 Kane, supra note 309, at 309. 
12 3 Response to Petition Seeking Withdrawal of the Policy Described in the Agency's 
"Paper" NDA Memorandum of July 31, 1978, 45 Fed. Reg. 82052 (Dec. 12, 1980). 
u.s.c. 
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An additional complication was the invariable delay 
between the time the original pharmaceutical company's patents 
on the drug expired and the generic firm could begin commercial 
distribution of their product. As conducting the requisite 
clinical trials would typically constitute patent infringement, 
generic firms could not begin carrying out these tests during the 
term of the brand-name pharmaceutical company's patents. 
Moreover, the inevitable wait associated with the FDA-review 
process created further time lag between the end of a brand­
name pharmaceutical maker's patent term and the generic 
equivalent's entry to the market. However, the manufacturers 
of pioneer drugs were less than sympathetic to the plight of the 
generic firms, arguing the inadvertent marketplace exclusivity 
produced by the circumstances was not inequitable in light of 
the fact the FDA approval process often consumed many years of 
patent life. 313 
Nonetheless, in addition to extending the brand-name 
pharmaceutical makers patent term for up to five years as 
discussed above, the Hatch-Waxman Act made further changes 
to allow for easier entry into the marketplace by generic 
pharmaceutical makers. Instead of requiring such companies to 
complete their own clinical trials to demonstrate safety and 
efficacy, they would now be allowed to rely on the prior research 
from the brand-name manufacturer to market their essentially 
duplicate drug.314 As a result, the only new studies the generic 
manufacturers would need to conduct were clinical tests to prove 
the proposed drug was "bioequivalent" to the previously 
approved drug.315 
Moreover, as carrying out such experiments would typically 
constitute patent infringement, the Hatch-Waxman Act also 
added a statutorily based research exemption to supplement the 
common law experimental use privilege.316 This provision offers 
broad exemption from traditional infringement liability by 
allowing the making or using of a patented invention, so long as 
313 See Eisenberg, supra note 278, at 356-57. 
314 21 u.s_c. § 355G> (2006). 
315 Id. 
316 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(l) (2006). 
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such investigations are for purposes related to the development 
and submission of information under federal law which 
regulates the use of drugs.317 Consequently, a generic 
manufacturer can now complete the required studies during the 
term of the brand-name pharmaceutical maker's patents. 
Additionally, the company can submit a streamlined application 
called an Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") even 
before the patents associated with the pioneer drug have 
expired. 318 This allows a generic drug maker to also effectively 
avoid the delay normally associated with the FDA approval 
process. Nonetheless, the generic manufacturer will not be able 
to enter the marketplace until all applicable patents and related 
extensions of the brand-name pharmaceutical maker have 
actually expired. 
It should be noted that although an ANDA applicant is 
essentially permitted to make use of a brand-name 
pharmaceutical maker's prior clinical trial results, the generic 
drug company normally does not actually have access to this 
data. Instead, the generic drug manufacturer is able to take 
advantage of the earlier research more or less indirectly.319 
However, for an FDA applicant that plans to make a 
modification to the brand-name manufacturer's formulation 
thus disqualifying it from the ANDA process, the Hatch­
Waxman Act also included an additional section which permits 
such a drug maker to explicitly rely in whole or in part on 
another company's data.320 
317 Id. Recently, this safe harbor language was interpreted quite broadly by the U.S. 
Supreme Court to cover a full range of pre-clinical activities, including experimentation 
on drugs not ultimately the subject of an FDA application. Furthermore, the Court held 
that the statutory exemption is not limited to only studies relating to the safety of the 
drug in human subjects. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences, 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
318 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2006}. 
319 See JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 311 (2005). 
320 Id. at 312 (illustrating such a scenario by means of the example of an approved 
drug utilizing an active ingredient with a particular salt formation and a generic fJ.rm 
that wants to market a generic version of the approved drug with the same active 
ingredient but using a different salt formulation; in such a case the generic fJ.rm may be 
unable to ffie an ANDA because the proposed active ingredient will not be identical to 
that of the originally approved medication.) 
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3. Section 505(b)(2): Borrowing Data 
Section 505(b)(2) of the Hatch-Waxman Act allows for 
applications in which one or more of the investigations utilized 
in order to acquire FDA approval "were not conducted by or for 
the applicant."321 Section 505(b)(2) differs from a traditional 
NDA because the applicant does not have a "right of reference," 
defined as "the authority to rely upon, and otherwise use, an 
investigation for the purpose of obtaining approval of an 
application."322 Typically, a Section 505(b)(2) applicant is 
drawing upon clinical trial results appearing in published 
scientific literature.323 
Not surprisingly, the availability of Section 505(b)(2) 
generally leads to significant costs savings. The law essentially 
allows the applicant to "free ride" at the expense of other drug 
companies who had previously incurred the costs and risks 
associated with conducting their own trials. Nonetheless, 
despite objections by the pharmaceutical trade to the contrary, 
the FDA has somewhat surprisingly stated in drug industry 
guidance documents that such use of previous research "was 
intended to encourage innovation without creating duplicate 
work."324 Further, the FDA has maintained that both Section 
505(b)(2) and the ANDA process reflect the same principles, 
namely that "it is wasteful and unnecessary to carry out studies 
to demonstrate what is already known about a drug."325 
However, also similar to ANDA applicants, Section 505(b)(2) 
applicants must observe the term of any applicable patents 
covering their pharmaceutical, consequently requiring the 
expiration of such intellectual property protection before they 
321 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (2006) (codifying Section 505(b}(2) of the Hatch·Waxman 
Act). 
322 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (2008). 
323 FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: APPLICATIONS COVERED BY 
SECTION 505(b)(2) 2 (1999). It should be pointed out that this is usually without the 
benefit of the full underlying raw data from the studies. Id. This is due to the fact that 
pharmaceutical companies generally view this information as confidential material and 
fiercely resist attempts at complete disclosure. 
324 Id. at 3. 
32s Id. 
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may begin commercially distributing their product. 
4. Evaluating the Arguments 
The pharmaceutical industry's concerns that the public 
disclosure of clinical trial results, particularly the underlying 
raw data, will negatively impact their ability to obtain patents 
appear to be quite exaggerated. Most drug companies obtain 
patents very early on in the drug development process prior to 
beginning clinical trials. This protection will prevent any 
attempts by a competitor to enter the marketplace until the 
expiration of the term of an applicable patent or market 
exclusivity, 326 regardless of whether they have access to the 
results of another company's clinical trial data. While it is 
possible such data could be valuable to a competitor to assist in 
structuring their research strategy, as discussed above most 
pharmaceutical companies are already quite aware of the 
development activities of their fellow members in the drug 
industry. 
Furthermore, the company that originally sponsored a 
study would not lose all of its benefits if the trial results are 
subsequently revealed, as it would have had a multi-year head 
start in analyzing the data, as well as formulating plans to act 
upon said information.327 As one commentator explained, "By 
permitting substantial free-riding even without access to the 
underlying data, the Hatch-Waxman Act has thus taken the 
wind out of the sails of an argument against data disclosure that 
rests upon protection from free riders."328 Lastly, in attempting 
to prevent potential commercial loss, it is also important not to 
lose sight of the significant societal benefits that could be gained 
326 Market exclusivities prevent the FDA from approving, or in some cases even 
accepting, an application for a competing drug compound for a stated period of time. 
These exclusivities relate to new chemical entities (five years), new clinical studies (three 
years), generic drugs (180-day exclusivity for first ANDA on previously approved brand­
name drug), orphan drugs (seven years), and pediatric studies (extending exclusivity or 
patent protection on the innovator drug for six months). See THOMAS, supra note 319, at 
348-73. 
327 COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 3, at 15. 
a2s Eisenberg, supra note 278, at 382. 
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as a consequence of providing access to clinical trial results. 
D. Competitive Necessity 
The pharmaceutical industry has consistently asserted that 
preserving the confidentiality of clinical trial results is 
absolutely essential to ensuring their capacity to profit from the 
research they themselves conduct or financially sponsor.329 
Without the ability to potentially generate revenue as a result of 
these clinical studies, drug companies argue that there would be 
little incentive to engage in medical research in the first place. 330 
Moreover, the resulting reduction in necessary information 
production "could be extremely dangerous and have a 
detrimental effect on health care for years to come."331 
Despite the pharmaceutical industry's broad claims to the 
contrary, there is no credible support for the position that 
maintaining the secrecy of clinical trial data is necessary to 
promote clinical research or foster innovation.332 As the WHO's 
International Clinical Trials Registry Platform group concluded 
following formal consultations with representatives from the 
drug industry, medical community, and scientific field, "there is 
no convincing evidence that disclosure threatens competition 
and hence innovation. Indeed, openness might promote rather 
than stifle innovation."333 
329 See e.g., Janene Boyce, Disclosure of Clinical Trial Data: Why Exemption 4 of the 
Freedom of Information Act Should Be Restored, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 3 (2005); 
Howard L. Dorfman & Linda Pissott Reig, Avoiding Legal and Ethical Pitfalls of 
Industry-Sponsored Research: The Co-Existance of Research, Scholarship and Marketing 
in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 595 (2004); Scott M. Lassman, 
Transparency and Innuendo: An Alternative to Reactive Over-Disclosure, 69 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 69 (2006). 
330 See e.g., Boyce, supra note 329; Dorfman & Reig, supra note 329; Lassman, supra 
note 329. 
331 Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency 
Paradox, 82 IND. L.J. 623, 623 (2007). 
332 See Joel Lexchin, The Secret Things Belong Unto the Lord Our God: Secrecy in the 
Pharmaceutical Arena, 26 MED. & L. 417 (2007); Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. 
Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information: Reforming 
Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L.REV. 837 (1980); Sam Palmisano, The Information 
Puzzle, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Nov. 28, 2005, at 54. 
333 Sim et al., supra note 283, at 1631. 
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Greater dissemination of clinical trial results would likely 
reduce unnecessary duplication of research and thus improve its 
overall efficiency.334 Future studies could be informed by prior 
research which would decrease the probability of failure. 
Improvements in the drug development process would likely 
produce a considerable reduction in the cost of pharmaceutical 
research.335 A fairly recent study estimated that increasing the 
success rate from the current 21.5% to 33.3% would yield a 
reduction of $221 million in capitalized cost per new drug 
candidate.336 
Additionally, disclosure of research results could also 
enhance a drug company's financial outlook in yet another 
possibly unexpected way. Industry experts identify the inability 
to recruit study participants as the single greatest concern in 
the drug development process. 337 This is due to the fact that 
such problems can slow the approval process which can 
ultimately cause substantial financial losses.338 One estimate 
places the average cost to a drug manufacturer for each day's 
delay in obtaining FDA approval at an astounding $1.3 million 
dollars. 339 
The current public perception of the pharmaceutical 
industry could easily jeopardize clinical trial enrollments. 
However, the increased transparency associated with releasing 
study data may very well improve the public's perception of the 
benefits associated with participation in clinical trials. 
Consequently, this may positively affect patient accruals to the 
pharmaceutical industry's advantage. 
Accordingly, not only would drug companies recognize 
considerable financial savings, but also society would likely 
benefit from an acceleration in the discovery of new 
334 Id. 
335 Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, The Cost of New Drug Discovery and 
Development, 4 DISCOVERY MED. 172, 178 (2004). 
336 Id. 
337 Trudo Lemmens, Commercialized Medical Research and the Need for Regulatory 
Reform (Univ. of Toronto Legal Studies Series, Research Paper No. 967393, 2007). 
33s Id. 
339 See Bodenheimer, supra note 298. 
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treatments.340 In fact, the FDA has even expressly stated that 
there is "an urgent need to ... enhance collaboration among the 
government, industry, and academia."341 The agency reported 
that pharmaceutical companies have predominantly been 
submitting NDAs for variations on existing drugs instead of 
innovative drugs. 342 The FDA maintains further cooperation 
and sharing is essential to the development of pioneering 
treatments.343 This is due in large part to the fact that scientific 
breakthroughs rarely occur in complete isolation, but are 
usually the result of advancements made on the pioneering 
discoveries of earlier researchers.344 The ability to access and 
utilize information is critically important to societal progress.345 
E. Patient Confusion 
Ironically, pharmaceutical companies also claim their 
reluctance to release clinical trial results is actually due to their 
concern for patient welfare. The drug industry argues the 
dissemination of results from a single study could mistakenly 
depict safety or efficacy hazards which multiple trials afterward 
would reveal were a mere aberration and clearly not present. In 
the interim, however, patients may suffer unnecessary distress 
potentially leading to the discontinuation of critically important 
medication. Additionally, the disclosure of such negative clinical 
trial findings risks the creation of an unmerited strain on the 
doctor-patient relationship due to decreases in confidence over 
health provider competency.346 Moreover, drug companies 
340 See Krleza-Jeric et al., supra note 20. 
341 U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 42, at 2; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
supra note 3. 
342 U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 42, at 2; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
supra note 3. 
343 U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 42, at 2; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
supra note 3. 
344 See Christine D. Galbraith, A Panoptic Approach to Information Policy: Utilizing 
a More Balanced Theory of Property in Order to Ensure the Existence of a Prodigious 
Public Domain, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 3 (2007). 
34s Id. 
346 Celia B. Fisher, Clinical Trials Results Databases: Unanswered Questions, 311 
SCIENCE 180, 180-81 (2006). 
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contend the administrative resources that would inexorably be 
required to fulfill reporting obligations may raise the costs of 
pharmaceuticals.347 The drug industry asserts this type of 
highly technical information is simply not the sort of material 
that can be properly evaluated by an untrained individual. 
However, it seems as if the pharmaceutical companies may 
have improperly discounted the intellectual abilities of patients 
today. The testimony of a doctor at a congressional hearing on 
the FDA approval process provided the following contrary 
characterization: ''You would be amazed how sophisticated a lot 
of patients are, and again, others on the panel can speak to this, 
who come to physicians [having] really done a tremendous 
amount of research and do know a lot."348 The Internet has 
already provided the public with access to vast amounts of 
medical information. Moreover, healthcare has become far more 
of a collaborative process between doctor and patient, rendering 
the rather paternalistic practice of viewing a physician as the 
unquestioned authority on medical issues virtually obsolete. To 
the extent that patients need to be alerted to the possibility that 
results from a single study may not necessarily provide a 
comprehensive estimation of the true value of a particular 
treatment, an appropriately worded disclaimer would seem a 
suitable approach to adequately advising the public. In the end, 
the purported disadvantages associated with disseminating 
results information are not compelling enough to justify 
preventing patients from accessing information that could allow 
them to make better educated decisions concerning their own 
health and welfare. 
VII. ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF DISCLOSURE 
Leaving aside the many shortcomings associated with the 
arguments advanced for limiting any sort of further disclosure of 
clinical trial results, there are compelling independent 
347 Id. 
348 FDA's Drug Approval Process: Up to the Challenge?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Dr. David 
Fassler). 
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justifications for further release of such data. Changes to the 
FDA's funding structure, in addition to the dramatic increase in 
private sponsorship of research studies, collectively contribute to 
a state of affairs that is in desperate need of enhanced 
transparency. Moreover, the revelation that clinical trials with 
negative outcomes are far less likely to be published makes 
improved access to the results of all clinical trials even more 
critical. Lastly, in order to allow for informed decision making 
by patients and their doctors, as well as comply with ethical 
norms, full disclosure of clinical trial results must occur. 
A. PDUFA & FDA Transparency Issues 
In response to drug industry's complaints that the FDA was 
taking far too long to review and approve new drug applications, 
Congress passed the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) 
in 1992.349 The legislation established a program through which 
additional staff would be hired with the objective of reducing 
approval times. 350 This would be funded by fees paid by the 
pharmaceutical companies in connection with the submission of 
their applications for evaluation.351 The Act also provided for 
the establishment of performance goals for the agency, including 
completing review of a specified percentage of applications 
within particular time frames. 352 Additionally, the statute 
provided that the funds generated by the user fee program 
349 Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491. 
350 !d. 
351 Id. The PDUFA also contained a provision that required reauthorization every five 
years to continue. Such action was taken in 1997 as part of the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act, in 2002 in connection with the Public Health and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act, and most recently in 2007 with the 
Federal Drug Administration Amendments Act. See Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296; Public Health Security 
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 
594; Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 
Stat. 823. 
352 Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491; U.S. 
Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 42, at 10 (explaining that current goals state 
that the FDA should complete its intial review and act on ninety percent of all priority 
NDAs within six months and ninety percent of all standard NDAs within ten months). 
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would not be used for any other administrative purposes. 353 
PDUF A in some respects could be considered a success. For 
drugs receiving priority review, 354 the median length for 
approval decreased from 14.9 months in 1997 to 6.7 months in 
2003. Similarly, standard review times were also reduced from 
27.2 months to 23.1 during the same time period. Nonetheless, 
the Act also appears to have created some very problematic 
conflicts of interest. 
In connection with a congressional hearing examining the 
Vioxx controversy, a director in the FDA's drug safety division 
described the existence of a culture in which the FDA "views the 
pharmaceutical industry it is supposed to regulate as its client, 
over-values the benefits of the drugs it approves and seriously 
under-values, disregards and disrespects drug safety."355 A study 
prepared by the General Accounting Office (GAO) at the request 
of the Senate's Committee on Health, Education, Labor and 
Pensions, found that as a result of PDUFA, the "FDA reduced 
staffing levels for non-PDUFA activities each year, leaving the 
agency fewer resources to perform its other responsibilities" 
including safety-related activities. The GAO report also 
concluded that the legislation had "contributed to increased 
workload, high turnover rates, [as well as] reduced training time 
for scientists and medical officers on review teams."356 
Moreover, a survey conducted regarding the PDUFA 
further echoes such concerns. According to a report prepared by 
the Office of the Inspector General, which was based upon 
responses from almost 400 FDA scientists, new drug reviewers 
in the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) 
have been pressured to recommend approval of a drug even if 
they have reservations.357 The 2002 study also found that 
353 Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102·571, 106 Stat. 4491. 
354 Drugs receive priority review only if they are deemed to offer a therapeutic 
advantage over existing medications. See, e.g., Okie, supra note 130, at 1063. 
355 FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Finance, 108th Cong. (2004). 
356 Okie, supra note 130, at 1063 (discussing the Office of Inspector Gen., FDA's 
Review Process for New Drug Applications: A Management Review 12 (2003)). 
357 Ensuring Drug Safety: Where Do We Go From Here?: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of the 
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almost one-fifth claimed to have been pushed to approve a new 
drug despite the existence of safety, efficacy, or quality 
questions.358 Additionally, with respect to drugs that were 
granted priority review, more than half of the respondents 
stated they were not given enough time to conduct an in-depth, 
scientific review.359 
These findings raise serious issues regarding the quality of 
FDA review and its corresponding impact on public safety. 
Moreover, this lends further substantiation to the need for 
disclosure of full clinical trial results to allow for additional 
scrutiny of the FDA's approval decisions. Such transparency 
would help ensure that public interest is always the first 
priority. 360 
B. Impact of Industry Influence on Clinical Trials 
It is estimated that more than eighty percent of all clinical 
trials are now funded by for~profit companies.361 The 
consequences of this tidal shift away from government support 
of research studies is still not yet entirely clear, however, 
evidence is beginning to mount regarding the myriad of ways in 
which pharmaceutical industry sponsorship affects the outcome 
and reporting of clinical trials. The results of such influence can 
appear even in the earliest stages of a research study in 
connection with the way in which a company structures the drug 
trial. 362 For example, one reported instance of this type of 
activity occurred in connection with an investigational pain 
medication.363 Initial data indicated that the sponsor's drug had 
an increased risk for heart attacks when evaluated against an 
American Society of Health-System Pharmacists citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
FDA'S REVIEW PROCESS FOR NEW DRUG APPLICATIONS: A MANAGEMENT REVIEW (2003)). 
358 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FDA'S REVIEW PROCESS FOR NEW DRUG 
APPLICATIONS: A MANAGEMENT REVIEW 12 (2003). 
359 Id. at 10. 
360 See Lexchin, supra note 332, at 417. 
361 See Vedantam, supra note 14, at Al. 
3 2 6 Press Release, AAAS, Pharma Facing Tough Challenges, Speakers Say at AAAS 
S&T Forum (May 17, 2007), available at 
http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2007/0517stpf.shtml (last visited Apr. 4, 2009). 
363 Id. 
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existing pain reliever. 364 Consequently, the pharmaceutical 
company altered the structure of the trial, replacing the original 
comparison drug with a different medication in its class that 
was considered much more risky, maximizing the potential for a 
favorable outcome.365 As one commentator notes, by utilizing 
these sorts of tactics, ''You can usually figure out a trial that 
gets to 'yes."'366 
Additional reports provide further evidence that 
commercial sponsorship of trials can result in reduced 
objectivity and a potentially biased presentation of evidence 
concerning the benefit to risk profile of the product. 367 For 
example, a review of clinical trials funded by pharmaceutical 
companies comparing psychiatric medications showed that in 
ninety percent of the clinical investigations, the outcome favored 
the sponsor's drug.368 However, if a medication did well against 
a competitor in one particular trial, it invariably came in second 
when the clinical investigation was instead funded by the 
competitor. 369 Similarly, an analysis of seventy articles on 
clinical trials evaluating the safety of drugs utilized to treat 
cardiovascular disorders demonstrated a comparable effect. 
Ninety-six percent of the authors of articles that were 
36< Id. 
365 Id. 
366 Id. (statement of Dr. Deborah Zarin, Director of the ClinicalTrials.gov registry). 
For other examples of such conduct related to trial structure see Paula A. Rochon et al., 
A Study of Manufacturer·Supported Trials of Nonsteroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs in 
the Treatment of Arthritis, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 185 (2006) (dosing of the 
pharmaceutical manufacturer's drug was higher than that of the comparison drug) and 
Helle Krogh Johansen et al., Problems in the Design and Reporting of Trials of 
Antifungal Agents Encountered During Meta-Analysis, 282 JAMA 1752 (1999) (vast 
majority of company sponsored trials designed so that drugs under study were all taken 
orally; however, the comparison medication was known to poorly absorb and as such was 
traditionally only given intravenously). 
7 36 FDA's Drug Approval Process: Up to the Challenge?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 109th Cong. 36-41 (2005) (testimony of Dr. 
Thomas R. Fleming). 
368 Stephen Heres, et al., Why Olanzapine Beats Risperidone, Risperidone Beats 
Quetiapine, and Quetiapine Beats Olanzapine: An Exploratory Analysis of Head-to-Head 
Comparison Studies of Second Generation Antipsychotics, 163 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 185, 
185 (2006); see also AAAS, supra note 362 (statement of Shannon Brownlee). 
369 AAAS, supra note 362. 
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supportive of the use of the drug under investigation had 
financial relationships with the manufacturer of the 
pharmaceutical, while only thirty-seven percent of those critical 
of the medication had industry sponsorship.37° Furthermore, a 
large survey of more than a thousand original research studies 
found a "statistically significant association between industry 
sponsorship and pro-industry conclusions."371 
Issues also frequently arise in connection with the 
publication of articles related to industry-sponsored clinical 
trials. This is due in large part to the fact that industry 
sponsors often assert ownership over the data collected in 
connection with the studies they fund372 and consequently 
impose restrictions on publishing and the sharing of research 
results.373 As such, "[i]f a test suggests that a drug is effective in 
treating a certain condition, the company will push to get its 
results published in a prestigious journal. If the results reflect 
poorly on the drug, they often never appear in public."374 
Likewise, to the extent the study results are a mixture of 
positive and negative outcomes, industry-funded investigators 
may downplay any unfavorable data or selectively report the 
findings. For example, in one study researchers reported that 
"most adverse events were not serious" when in actuality seven 
children were hospitalized as a result of side-effects attributable 
to the medication under examination. 375 In another case 
involving the pain reliever Celebrex, the Journal of the 
American Medical Association ("JAMA") published an article 
highlighting the medication's beneficial safety profile.376 The 
70 3 Henry Thomas Stelfox, et al., Conflict of Interest in the Debate Over Calcium­
Channel Antagonists, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101, 101 (1998). 
371 Justin E. Bekelman, et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in 
Biomedical Research-A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454, 454 (2003). 
72 3 See infra Part VI discussing the frequent use of contracts in an attempt to 
delineate data ownership. 
373 Bekelman, supra note 371, at 454. 
374 Gardiner Harris, Spitzer sues a Drug Maker, Saying It Hid Negative Data, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 3, 2004, at Al. 
375 AAAS, supra note 362 (statement of Shannon Brownlee). 
73 6 Fred E. Silverstein et al., Gastrointestinal Toxicity with Celecoxib us Nonsteroidal 
Anti-inflammatory Drugs for Osteoarthritis and Rheumatoid Arthritis: The CLASS 
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authors of the report claimed that the clinical trial data 
demonstrated that the drug was associated with significantly 
lower rates of gastrointestinal ulcers when compared with two 
older medications.377 However, it was only after the piece 
appeared in print that JAMA's editors learned that the authors 
of the study had utilized only the data from the first six months 
of the trial and failed to disclose the actual length of the clinical 
investigation was in fact twelve months. It turned out that the 
data from the year-long study showed no statistical advantage· 
between Celeb rex and the comparison drugs. 378 
Furthermore, as part of a pharmaceutical company's 
publication strategy, articles on trial results are increasingly 
prepared by medical information companies.379 This practice 
known as "ghost writing'' entails providing nearly finished 
manuscripts to prestigious academics to put their names on the 
pieces prior to publication, individuals who often have not had 
any involvement whatsoever in the clinical research itself.380 
For example, in connection with marketing the drug Vioxx, a 
study in the Journal of the American Medical Association 
identified dozens of articles actually drafted by employees of the 
drug manufacturer Merck, but which attributed authorship to 
prestigious doctors who did not disclose industry financial 
support. 381 
Not surprisingly, numerous studies have shown that 
articles appearing in published literature have a 
disproportionately high quantity of positive outcomes.382 This 
Study: A Randomized Controlled Trial., 284 JAMA 1247, 1247 (2000). 
377 Id. 
73 8 Susan Okie, Missing Data on Celebrex- Full Study Altered Picture of Drug, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 5, 2001, at All. 
379 Lemmens, supra note 337. 
380 Id.; see also Stephanie Saul, Ghostwriters Used in Vioxx Studies, Article Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, April15, 2008, at Al. 
1 38 Joseph S. Ross, et al., Guest Authorship and Ghostwriting in Publications Related 
to Rofecoxib, 299 JAMA 1800, 1800 (2008). 
382 See e.g., Robert John Simes, Publication Bias: The Case for an International 
Registry of Clinical Trials, 4 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1529 (1986); Kay Dickersin et al., 
Factors Influencing Publication of Research Results, 267 JAMA 374 (1992); Kay 
Dickersin, The Existence of Publication Bias and Risk Factors for its Occurrence, 263 
JAMA 1385 (1990). 
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propensity on the part of investigators to submit manuscripts for 
publication based upon the positive results of the study findings 
is often referred to as "publication bias."383 Numerous studies 
have documented this "clear correlation between non-publication 
and lack of significant findings."384 While journal editors may 
have some responsibility for this situation, the unwillingness of 
investigators to submit inconclusive or negative research results 
for publication appears to be the main factor. 385 Furthermore, 
trials with positive results are also generally published more 
quickly, on average two to three years earlier than those with 
inconclusive or negative results. 386 Consequently, the 
cumulative impact of these issues associated with industry 
sponsorship of clinical trials is a quite unbalanced picture of the 
safety profile associated with a particular drug. Knowledge of 
the full range of risks and benefits is essential for physicians 
and patients to make truly informed decisions regarding proper 
medical care. Access to both negative and positive trial results 
is crucial to ensuring the most appropriate treatment is selected 
for any given individual. Additionally, if detailed information on 
all studies were available, it could be utilized by scientists to 
perform meta-analyses of all the existing studies that have been 
conducted involving a particular medication. The aggregation of 
raw data would allow for earlier detection of significant adverse 
effects. 387 As such, it is absolutely essential that full trial 
protocols and their attendant results be made publicly accessible 
to ensure that this distortion of available data does not harm 
patients. 
C. Clinical Trials and Ethical Norms 
Clinical research involving human subjects can only be 
383 Kay Dickersin, The Existence of Publication Bias and Risk Factors {or its 
Occurrence, 263 JAMA 1385, 1385 (1990). 
384 Jennifer L. Gold and David M. Studdert, Clinical Trial Registries: A Reform that 
is Past Due, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 811 (2007). 
385 Id. 
386 S. Hopewell et al., Time to Publication for Results of Clinical Trials, COCHRANE 
DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS, Issue 2 (2007). 
387 Zarin et al. supra note 195, at 2113. 
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justified if the experiments conducted produce generalizable 
knowledge.388 Many in the medical community have interpreted 
this ethical principle to require the public disclosure of all 
research results. 389 This is due to the fact that individuals 
voluntarily participating in clinical trials expect information 
obtained from the study will be available to future patients and 
ultimately improve medical care.390 Nonetheless, this is not 
possible to the extent trial results are concealed or remain 
hidden. 
Moreover, if research results never become public, study 
participants may have risked the harm of the treatment with no 
recognizable benefit. This is in complete conflict with ethical 
codes that prohibit human subjects from being unnecessarily 
exposed to research harms. 391 The sponsor of a clinical trial 
therefore has an obligation to acknowledge the contribution of 
the participants by ensuring that study results are in the public 
domain.392 Additionally, to the extent that studies are not 
published, there exists a very real possibility the same mistakes 
may be repeated by other companies who are also developing 
drugs with the same or similar properties. Particularly when 
there are adverse effects related to the investigative 
medications, it seems immoral not to report such findings to 
prevent future trial participants from needlessly being subjected 
to harm.393 
388 The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23, 192 {Apr. 18, 1979). 
389 See e.g., David Korn & Susan Ehringhaus, Principles for Strengthening the 
Integrity of Clinical Research, 1 PLOS CLINICAL TRIALS e1 (2006); Drazen & Wood, 
supra note 21, at 2809. 
390 See Korn & Ehringhaus, supra note 389, at 2-3; Drazen & Wood, supra note 21, at 
2809. 
39I See World Med. Ass'n, World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical 
Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, 284 JAMA 3043 (2000); The 
Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects 
of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (Apr. 18, 1979). 
392 Jeffrey M. Drazen et al., Open Clinical Trials, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1756, 1756 
(2007). 
393 Building a 21st Century FDA- Proposals to Improve Drug Safety and Innovation: 
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, llOth Cong. 2 (2006) 
(testimony of Dr. Steven E. Nissen). 
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Individuals who agree to participate in clinical trials 
typically assent to treatment in the belief that they are actually 
contributing to medical knowledge.394 If, however, the insight 
obtained from the study is never reported, ethical issues also 
arise over whether the patient was truly able to provide the 
obligatory informed consent. 395 This is particularly concerning 
where drug companies are "gaining financially from public 
involvement in trials, but refusing to reciprocate by making 
information from industry-sponsored trials generally 
available."396 Ethical guidelines clearly require that the rights 
of clinical trial participants must take precedence over 
commercial interests. 397 Furthermore, failure to do so is simply 
not defensible, since as between study participants and drug 
industry sponsors, it is very obvious who is taking the greater 
risk.398 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
It is imperative that the pharmaceutical industry recognize 
that without clinical trial participants they would not be able to 
generate the findings necessary to potentially obtain FDA 
approval on their products. Even more importantly, however, 
patients enrolled in such studies place their trust in these 
companies to ensure their safety, as well as advance medical 
knowledge. This cannot happen when drug companies and the 
FDA fail to disclosure meaningful clinical trial results. As such, 
genuine statutory reform to make the clinical trials process 
more transparent must occur so that proper protection is 
provided for all patients requiring medical care. 
394 Dickersin & Rennie, supra note 185, at 517. 
39s Id. 
396 Id. 
7 39 Sim et al., supra note 283, at 1632 (citing World Med. Ass'n, World Medical 
Association Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving 
Human Subjects, 284 JAMA 3043 (2000) and Nuremberg Code, reprinted in 2 TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL 
COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1949), available at 
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html). 
398 Drazen et al., supra note 392, at 1756. 
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